Risk, Force and Reputation - As exemplified in the current conflict in Iraq.
The current campaign in Iraq can be seen as a classical example of an international actor (US government) seeking to maintain its reputation for invincibility after a formidable attempt to terrorize its population (attacks of 9/11/01). Taking a rationalist/realist point of view, the current and ongoing operations of US armed forces in Afghanistan and Iraq can be viewed as a rational choice to sustain America's stand as the world's sole hegemonic power. It is far fetched to believe that the masterminds of the 9/11 attacks intended to directly take the role of the world's superpower. However, by successfully removing Saddam Hussein out of power (A long nemesis of the west) and gaining control of one of the world's fastest growing human population (Afghanistan), the US government has accepted risks (over 3000 soldiers killed, hundreds of billions in military spending) that would in turn maintain its status and deter others from attempting to change the current balance of power. One can argue that the current Iraq campaign is an ‘Indirect Preemptive Attack’. It is difficult to argue that Saddam’s regimes posed a serious threat to the US and its citizens (or US interest for that matter), as often is the case however, that the benefits of a preemptive attack are never fully appreciated. By not initiating a ‘Campaign Against Terrorism’, a potential enemy of the US could assume that an attack from his side would draw a reaction from the US government that would be considered acceptable considering the circumstances. By ‘Overreacting’ to the 9/11 attacks and eliminating threats that were not serious threats in the first place (Hussein), the US government lays out the risks one aggressor have to consider when planning to carry out an attack.
On August 2007, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was released, “Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive.” The purpose of the NIE is two fold: first, the Estimate means to connect intelligence with the policy community and two, the Estimate means to provide a coherent analysis that contains “the best, unvarnished, and unbiased information.” The reports in some ways mirrors the President’s national security strategy introduced March 2006. Have we been enlightened about national security with this latest report?
The NIE is an important document. It provides government and US citizens alike a better idea of national security efforts. It is accessible to anyone. You are cautioned, however, that the report is merely an estimate and it does not predict. The proponents of the NIE know the level of uncertainty in the “war against terror.” Yet, there are a few things we do know.
We know that US threats are no longer domestic, home-grown or imported. After the President declared war on Iraq, we faced immediate national concerns—the safety of American troops and the safety of helpless Iraq citizens. We know that the character of this war is not the same as in previous wars. In the past, we fought after direct provocation. Today, our enemy is not Iraq, it is Al-Qaeda—stateless and without boundaries. We know that security concerns are now embedded in what many policy makers and military leaders call an all-out civil war in Iraq. We know that the US is attempting to establish democracy in a foreign land and the US military is overseeing the process. We know that this is something different and something new. And there is large level of uncertainty in all of it. So are we keeping the best national security interests in mind?
Thomas Schelling asserts the rather Realist notion that the unpredictable and uncertain nature of foreign relations leads to the international system being one of “risk taking, characterized…by tests of nerve”. The actions of Russia in recent months are a brilliant example of this opinion of world politics in action. This nation’s loss of prestige and influence following the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union coupled with its own internal economic and civil strife led it to take a much less assertive position in international affairs in recent years. However, as recent news reports indicate, President Putin is trying to regain some of Russia’s stature by indicating a greater willingness to risk confrontation with the west, both militarily and diplomatically. Evidence of this recent rise in confrontation and assertiveness is not only evident in the high profile conflict with Great Britain over the assassination of Litvinenko, but in more recent military maneuvers as well. The BBC has reported on the Russian decision to resume strategic bombing runs (leading to one conflict with British fighters) as well as publicly testing the largest non-nuclear bomb in existence and recently staking its’ claim to the Arctic seabed in hopes of extending its grasp on natural resources. All of these actions present a direct challenge to US national security policy because of Russia’s strategic position in the UN as well as their ties with certain countries, like Syria and Iran, that the US is trying to marginalize for security reasons. The biggest security threat to the US comes from not knowing when the interests of a more assertive Russia will conflict in a non-negotiable manner with our own, or when the simple actions being taken to indicate strength may spiral into a more serious situation, as with Great Britain and the Litvinenko incident.
J. Ann Tickner puts forth a critique of Francis Fukuyama's foreign relations piece, "Women and the Evolution of World Politics" by arguing that Fukuyama is disingenuous in his discussion of women in national security and foreign relations. He contends that women and men are biologically different in the ways they think about and react to violence, war and aggression. Fukuyama believes that these aspects of women’s genetic identity will largely determine their behavior as heads of state. He goes on to imagine the characteristics of a world in which women were the major stakeholders, but it is to this hypothetical that Tickner objects. She argues that Fukuyama’s discourse distracts from the real objectives of feminist international relations, which focuses more on the need to disassemble patriarchal norms that dominate concerns of national security and foreign relations. It is nearly impossible to ignore Senator Hillary Clinton in this discussion, as she poises herself as the frontrunner Democratic candidate for President. As the campaign begins, Clinton is facing the question of gender from the media and voters. This gender-specific rhetoric is often aimed to highlight the biological differences between women and men, and contributes to the discourse that Fukuyama explored in his piece about women’s role in international relations. Clinton is viewed as a woman candidate, an identity she embraces, but one which she is careful not to let consume her campaign. In a recent debate, Clinton was asked how she responds to such criticism that portrays her as “unsatisfactorily feminine.” In response, Clinton admitted she was running as a woman (to which she received laughter and applause) but that she is not running because she is a woman. She went on to talk about her experience and skills, neglecting to bring up the gender issue again. In this way, she is attempting to make her gender a non-issue, and more of a supplementary characteristic that will help, not harm the office. In this way, she is applying the tenants of Tickner and choosing to challenge the discourse that makes Fukuyama’s notion’s of gender difference irrelevant.
It is also interesting to note that, in a recent poll of all voters, 28% found Clinton to be the best candidate to deal with national secutiry concerns, with Giuliani in 2nd with 20% of voters. So...how much is Clinton's gender really affecting voter's perceptions of her credentials and ability? What does this all mean in either Fukuyamar Tickner's thesis?
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/washington/16diplo.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper&oref=slogin In a speech given by President Bush, questions were raised regarding the level of intervention that the United States would be willing to participate in terms of what is going on in the country of Iran. Increasing violence in nearby Middle Eastern countries has Iranians worried that the United States will begin military strikes in their country. While some are advocating diplomacy, others in his administration are slyly pushing for the use of force instead. It seems as if the machinations of politics and the networking of information across political institutions are more calculated, important and deliberate than ever before. This is why Bush’s statements regarding national security and policy are so scrutinized, since many times the rhetoric of politicians may be more manipulative than their intended actions.
Shelling’s assertion that there are three major historical stages to consider when assessing how people and militia interact in warfare needs to be reassessed in terms of the new issues of terrorism. The fine line that delineates what is acceptable in terms of what is fair game within warfare needs to be examined. Terrorism in a post-9/11 world directly bases itself upon the notion that no-one can be safe from the violence of war. The study of national security thus has to change as well, so many of the principles in Arms and Influence are still relevant, but there also a need for a more specific examination of the unique issues of modern warfare.
The different types of victory discussed in the 9/12 lecture are also related to these interactions between countries: if there is no declared warfare, how does a country win or lose (such as in this case between the United States and Iran)? If terrorism does not have these classic boundaries, then what will the measurement be for success or failure in terms of policy and actions?
In Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling talks about war in the sense that the capabilities and threats of foreign actors matter more than the actual act of war. He introduces the idea that uncertainty acts to make threats credible. Such is the case in the U.S. war in Iraq. When a hegemonic superpower goes to war against a much smaller terrorist network, the level of uncertainty rises immensely. In a war like this, diplomacy and negotiation is so rare that all threats are seen as legitimate, which causes states to rush into action. It seems like every day the news is reporting on why the U.S. should not have gone to war in Iraq and that we are fighting a war destined for failure, but after reading Schelling’s book it became clear to me that the amount of uncertainty in the equation changed the “chess game” we were engaged in. The U.S. was forced to make an assessment of how willing we were to take the risk of not going to war depending on the threats we faced at that time. It may not have been an overly ambitious and aggressive administration that drove us into a 6-year long foreign fight, but the extreme uncertainty of the situation. Although one may not agree with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Schelling’s arguments make you wonder if we were better off being safe than sorry.
Last week, General David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq, told Congress that the Bush administration’s strategy would remain the same. He believed the war was going well and the U.S. was making tangible progress. This relates perfectly to our class discussion about the perceptions of victory. Although the war in Iraq is far from over, one can still wonder about its outcome. There will always be disagreement about the war’s success or failure on the level of individuals, but what will the overall assessment of the war in Iraq be? If it is widely seen as a victory, then what kind? It is hard to tell even that because there are so many theories about why the U.S. went to war in the first place. Unless the intentions are specifically stated, it is hard to say whether we achieved core aims or achieved an optimal policy. An article in the Sacramento Bee Forum section entitled “Predictions of success” , talks about General Petraeus’ speech to Congress and says, “Once again, we have a general repeatedly promising to save Western civilization by turning the corner in yet another intractable and unnecessary foreign war.” Using the word unnecessary just proves that the aims of the United States in the war in Iraq have not been made clear to the general public, who in most cases are the ones doing the “score-keeping”. I think it is imperative that a government make very clear to the citizens exactly what the aims and goals of that institution are in going to war because war is never merely between governments; it affects every citizen of that state. I do believe that “Of war men will ask its outcome, not its causes”(Seneca), but the outcome can only really be fairly judged depending on its causes.
President Bush recently declared that he plans to withdrawal troops from Iraq and place them into support rolls rather then frontline combat positions. This move by President Bush as based on his belief in a policy he calls “return on success”. As of Sept. 12th 65% of Americans disapprove of President Bush’s handling of the “situation in Iraq”. 1 Thus, one can conclude that the President is desperately trying to gain popular support for a war that is increasingly unpopular. 2 Thomas Schelling offers tremendous insight and wisdom that relate to the current Iraq crisis. He states that the importance of coercion within military conflict. Currently, this coercion comes in the form of “latent” violence committed by insurgents in Iraq. The current death toll in Iraq is minimal in comparison to most military conflict but the pain inflicted by such violence exploits America’s value for human life. Thus, “it is not the pain and damage itself but its influence on somebody’s behavior that matters.” 3 This coercive “latent” violence has forced incredible amounts of “hurt” and “pain” upon the American people and subsequently low approval ratings of the Iraq war. Thus, President Bush is forced to redefine the parameters of military victory and success within Iraq in order to regain public support. Yet, the United States abides by a set of values that restrict us from waging brutal violence upon civilian populations. When confronted with guerilla warfare the most powerful military in the world cannot use unrestricted violence as a means to hurt and coerce the enemy into submission because of unwavering values held by the American people. In conclusion, Schelling demonstrates that coercion in the hands of terrorist can be used to inflict unimaginable amounts of pain in the face of tremendous military might.
Success Allows Gradual Troop Cuts, Bush Says New York Times, Steven Lee Myers and Carl Hulse Washington, Sept. 13th http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/14/washington/14prexy.html?n=Top/News/World/Countries%20and%20Territories/Iraq
1 Associated Press-Ipsos poll conducted by Ipsos Public Affairs. Sept. 10-12, 2007. N=1,000 adults nationwide. MoE ± 3.1., http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm 2 Success Allows Gradual Troop Cuts, Bush Says, Steven Lee Myers and Carl Hulse, September 14, 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/14/washington/14prexy.html?n=Top/News/World/Countries%20and%20Territories/Iraq 3 Arms and Influence, Thomas C. Schelling, The Diplomacy of Violence: 2,4,6
The United States, Pakistan, and the War on Terror
Security cooperation with non-European states has always been a tense issue for the U.S., due to the (sometimes) overbearing proliferation of American values and policies. This is especially evident in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, where a poll taken on 9/11/07 shows that al-Qaeda has a 43 percent approval rating and that 66 percent believe the U.S.-led War on Terror is motivated by anti-Islam sentiment.[1] Pakistan, under President Pervez Musharraf, has been an irreplaceable ally in the fight against terror due to the shared border with Afghanistan and symbolically as a Muslim-majority state (not unlike Saudi Arabia and Egypt during the First Gulf War). However, Musharraf is increasingly unpopular within his own country.
From the U.S., Musharraf has been able to gain an abundant amount of money and diplomatic support because of his efforts against Islamist extremists. Nevertheless, this year, Pakistan experienced several political shifts, all of which have served to weaken Islamabad’s legitimacy. As a result, the U.S. continues to struggle with its policies towards Pakistan, which preserves to alienate the Pakistani public in favor of Musharraf and the military.
The U.S. should be developing an alternative policy aimed towards forming a partnership with the Pakistani people, not Musharraf. Although he remains the safe bet, expert analysis shows that on a whole, Pakistanis are moderate Muslims: Islamic extremism thrives only when the country is under military rule. Recent political negotiations on government power sharing have been held between the Pakistani president and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto – all without the consent of the voting public.
A stable Pakistan is a democratic Pakistan – that much is known. The only thing now is for Washington to explicitly support a civilian government that is chosen by the Pakistani people.
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner statement “we must prepare ourselves for the worst” addressed Iran’s continued defiance of the issue on nuclear materials. Though these remarks may be nothing but an empty threat, the idea of using force or the threat of force in diplomacy is nothing new. Iran was angered by the remarks but still continues it civilian nuclear program against growing international pressure. Former commander of US forces in the Middle East General John Abizad commented by asking for continued international pressure and added "I believe the United States, with our great military power, can contain Iran" somewhat echoing Kouchner and past remarks.
With the Iranian issue of nuclear material, constant tension along the Israel-Palestinian border, and terrorism being some of the major issue in international news it seems that diplomacy or soft power is weakening, making the use of force more feasible. Force “the greatest persuader in international relations,” maybe the only means of achieving goals especially in the face of continued defiance and reluctance. Iran still continues its program despite numerous sanctions imposed by other nations somewhat resembling Iraq before the invasion. What makes this interesting is the actual presence of nuclear material for peaceful means but the probability of converting them to nuclear weapons considering Iran’s goals in the Middle East and remarks toward Israel are high. The question is how much longer will the international community wait before arms are taken up. Even though Iraq and Afghanistan are unresolved, this does not mean that war will not happen. Other states have mentioned that military intervention has always been an option and because of the adverse attitude Iran has with the West and constant instability in the region, diplomacy may exhaust itself making war a reality.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/22/AR2007092201353.html The Washington Post reported today about a high-level diplomatic conference for the nations most effected by the Iraq War. Probably the most important delegate at that conference was the Iranian Foreign Minister. His country's interest in ended the war is strong, but his country's relations with the War's largest proponent (the U.S.) have been strained by negative sanctions and harsh words. As Ninic points out in THE LOGIC OF POSITIVE ENGAGMENT, this has not had the best of consequences.
But Iran is not the perfect example of the ill-effects of negative sanctions and the possibilities attached to positive sanctions. The European Union has, for some time now, been an advocate of positive sanctions in dealing with Iran and has offered many carrots if Iran will stop its nuclear program; the enrichment of uranium continues. While I have no doubt that positive sanctions can go a long way at reforming countries, it seems apparent that there are situations outside of their reach. Iran is a perfect case in point.
All sources of power in Iran currently believe Western Values are wrong at the very least. When diplomacy with Iran happens, it happens with the shadow of that fact. No matter who is represented from a Western-style Democracy, the Iranian government sees their motives as originating from a foolish or perverse place. All relations with them, including positive and negative sanctions, are viewed with this in mind. The only reason for Iran to accord with an offer is when it fits into their interests, which they define and can redefine. The only way to make Iran a viable negotiating partner, is to bring them into the western world by unconditionally dropping all current sanctions against them and letting them experience, as a nation, the positive effects of our life style.
I don’t think that Iran perceives all sanctions—positive or negative—as “foolish or perverse” simply because they originate from the West. While there is tension, mistrust, and an incontrovertible conflict of interests in the nuclear issue, I agree that compromise and positive sanctions still have a place in the matter; Nincic proposes a “tit-for-tat” arrangement whereby the US would reward Iran if it could provide evidence of nuclear responsibility (334). In a recent interview, Ahmadinejad asked, “why Iran should stop an activity in which the United States and Britain were also engaged” (1). I think that the spirit of compromise (which is arguably absent on both sides) must be apparent if Iran and the US are to deem each other, as you say, viable negotiating partners.
In addition to his emphasis on the importance of positive sanctions and the ineffectiveness of negative ones, Nincic also explains that carrots are more effective when the “rogue regime” is experiencing unstable equilibrium domestically. In reference to the penultimate post, I think that the use of force to resolve issues with Iran would be counterintuitive in more ways than one: apart from the obvious consequences of using force (death, destruction, intensifying the anti-American sentiment in Iran and potentially across the globe), the use of force would severely complicate the prospect of using ANY sanctions with Iran in the future (positive or negative) by further consolidating this aforementioned equilibrium.
Just to further complicate this issue, how does Nincic's positive-sanction paradigm shift when the “rogue regime” acts independently of a sovereign entity? How would a country like the US (especially given the degree to which it is entrenched in anti-terrorist rhetoric) offer sticks to actors that operate outside of (or across) state boundaries, that are not formally integrated into the economy/ mainstream, and who have essentially zero accountability when it comes to responding to commitments/sanctions?
“U.S. Accuses Iran of Arms Smuggling” – Security Cooperation
On Saturday, U.S. troops were hit by surface-to-air missiles that uses an infrared guidance system in eastern Baghdad. An American soldier was killed and others were wounded when the EFP hit their patrol. The US military accused Iran of smuggling surface-to-air missiles and other advanced weapons into Iraq for use against American troops. It was believed that Iran smuggled weapons to Shiite militias in Iraq.
U.S. troops arrested an Iranian in the Kurdish city. The officials believe that he is a member of the elite Quds force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards that smuggles weapons into Iraq. This happened while the Iranian President Mahmous Ahmadinejad was at New York to address the UN General Assembly. The man arrested, Mahmudi Farhadi, had been invited to Iraq and had been cleared by Iraq. The Iranian President condemned the Iranian’s arrest and said he would like to clear things up.
Perspective to the Iraqis, it was not right to arrest Muhmudi Farhadi because of suggested ties by the US. It was not surprising that the US reacted this way because of security reasons but arresting without cooperating with Iraq and Iran should not have been done. It is very important for security cooperation, for each side expects the other to provide security for each other unless they want the relationship between them affected.
Iranian President, Mahmoud Amadinejad, addressed the U.N. on Tuesday, and declared the issue of Iranian nuclear development “closed” to further debate and negotiation. This is most likely in response to recent actions taken by the U.S. aimed at increasing the pressure on Tehran. Thus far, the U.S.’s strategy for engaging Tehran has emphasized the use of disincentives, including economic sanctions and the threat of violence. But why does the U.S. pursue its policy of disincentives with Iran, while it has reoriented its engagement strategy with North Korea to one of positive engagement? As Baldwin mentions in his article, “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” the effectiveness of these two different strategies of engagement and how the target regimes respond to them is dependent on where Tehran and Pyongyang’s baseline expectations lie.
When the Bush administration came to power in the U.S., they reversed the previous administrations policies of positive engagement with North Korea, saying it was rewarding bad behavior and creating incentives for further infractions and misbehavior. Withholding these rewards was viewed as punishment by North Korean leaders because their expectation was they would receive such benefits. This baseline expectation has not changed in North Korea, which is why the only way to move forward in the six party talks was by offering North Korea a few carrots in return for its cooperation. Eventually, it may be necessary to offer concession to Tehran for similar cooperation. For now, however, Tehran does not yet have a baseline expectation for receiving rewards. Its current expectations are for avoiding violence posed by the U.S. threat, and withholding this punishment can be viewed as a reward for Tehran’s cooperation. This strategy may be limited in the long-run, but it is enough to keep Iran engaged in negotiations. In other words, the debate over Iran’s nuclear development is not “closed.”
Just one hour ago, the AFP reported Bush authorized $25 million in oil aid to North Korea (NK) for complying with the “Initial Actions” Agreement in which nuclear reactors in NK were opened to international inspection and shutdown in February 2007. The Six-Party Talks currently being held in Beijing aim to stop all NK nuclear programs by 12/31/2007. Critics have objected that the US is being “gullible” by expecting NK to keep its word.
However as David Kang points out in “The Debate over North Korea,” both the US and NK seem to have credibility issues. In 1994, the US and NK signed the Agreed Framework in which the US promised to provide two light-water reactors by 2003 and formal security guarantees. In exchange, NK would freeze its nuclear reactors and allow international inspection. However, as Kang points out, the US was four years behind schedule in providing the reactors. Also, the US never offered formal security guarantees, and rather publicly maintained that use of military force against NK was still an option. NK, unsurprisingly, abandoned the agreement to restart its reactors and expel inspectors in December 2002.
I believe the underlining problem here is that both parties started off on the wrong foot, ruining their credibility and setting a precedence of irresponsibility. Therefore many of the negotiations that came between the US and NK after the meltdown of the Agreed Framework proved to be frustrating. Victor Cha argues that NK was at fault because it “completely broke” out of the Agreed Framework by restarting its reactors, while the US merely showed “negligence in implementing” its promises. Isn’t neglecting to implement a contract basically breaking it? The US, by failing to keep its word, demonstrated to NK that it was not truly willing to engage. Cha also argues that the US should further “isolate” NK. Honestly, how much more isolated can NK get? Today, by attempting to bring NK out of isolation (a state it desperately wants to escape), the leaders of the Six Party Talks made a smart move. Hopefully all sides can keep their promises this time and set a much needed precedence of credibility.
Victory, engagement, national security – all these concepts have been deemed untidy. Yet, in attempts to clarify such notions, discussions have been limited to questions and dynamics on the structural level, and how state dynamics narrowly influence foreign policy. Waltz’s parsimonious theory of realism most likely accounts for such inclinations towards structural level discussions, yet one must beg the question: What about EH Carr’s argument for a balance between pure realism and utopianism (utopianism, defined here as accounting for the common man, and not just states as THE level of analysis)? Victory, engagement, and national security – all these concepts influence policies that are in reaction to and effects of state dynamics, but what IS the “state”? States, ultimately, are made up of people. Foreign policy-making and questions of international relations all have real and ultimate consequences on the people (the human cost of war, for example); likewise, the people have real impacts on the policy that offsets international interactions. At the cost of beating a dead horse, the War on Iraq is a perfect example of how the domesticity affects foreign policy making and international questions, arenas traditionally limited to “state” autonomy and authority. While 9/11 spurred the American domesticity - and the sympathy and support of other domesticities – to embark on a path of war, the more recent domestic backlashes against the War on Iraq are likewise beginning to bring to bear challenges to foreign policy, as well as changes in international opinion. In the New York Times today, one of the front-page stories (at least on their website) documented soldiers’ current experiences on the “battlefield.” One soldier talked about how his 2-year old daughter doesn’t know who he is because of his long deployment in Iraq. Real consequences/stories like these – with the help of domestic dynamics such as the media - mobilize and enable people to affect domestic decision-making processes, undoubtedly. It was the stories of 9/11 that largely guided our course of action. Furthermore, in light of the Democratic Peace Theory, US political leaders are accountable to their publics. My point in this discussion is not simply “political,” but to point out that international relations questions beg representation of what is actually happening on the ground. So, to ask the same question Wolfers asked: Does national security necessarily only entail hard national security interests? Moreover, to emphasize one of Mandel’s points: According to whose perspective does victory matter? Domestic publics are too large a force to be left out of discussions of national security.
The logic of positive incentives seems relatively intuitive to me. In order to start a beneficial relationship between two parties it seems natural that one must make the first generous gesture in order to establish trust and encourage cooperation. Nincic and Baldwin are very clear in addressing the possible gains that could be had from using these positive sanctions in dealing with “renegade regimes”. However, I wanted to pose the question of whether there are negative externalities to applying positive incentives to countries which are acting in ways which either the international community or individual nations find dangerous or inhumane. Iran’s relationship with the United States would certainly be a contemporary example of a corrosive association which needs to address the dilemma of sanctions and incentives. These two countries seem so ideologically opposed in the areas of nuclear proliferation, Israel’s sovereignty, women’s rights, and historical understandings it seems almost impossible to propose a systematic method of developing some sort of reconciliation. However, if the tactic of positive incentives is so intuitive, why hasn’t the U.S. employed this strategy? Furthermore are there any dangers to offering positive sanctions to Iran? Snyder briefly mentions that positive engagements can come across as a weakening of one’s resolve and embolden an adversary. I would also add that positive sanctions may send a message to other nations who may attempt to “freeride” on the benefits of such policies and hypothetically pose themselves as a threat in order to demand the same treatment. Lastly, the word incentive, to me, implies that an action must be taken in order to earn or deserve the positive treatment; and if the requirements of the positive incentive are not met, and the reward is taken away, that creates another set of complications where what was once meant to be a positive gesture now has turned into the proverbial “stick”.
Two weeks ago, Buddhist monks took to the streets of Rangoon to protest dramatic increases in fuel prices, and more symbolically, the military junta that has ruled for over fifteen years, leading to a crippled economy and flagrant human rights abuses. Nearly every article on the demonstration takes note of the 1988 protests that occurred under similar circumstances (except led by students), and that led to over 3000 deaths. While there was some hope that the international community would intervene to prevent a repeat of 1988, today’s BBC headline, “Burmese monks ‘to be sent away’” is a good indicator that history may already be repeating itself. So what lessons haven’t been learned?
Negative sanctions don’t work (at least when your friend is China). At the UN General Assembly last week, President Bush announced that the U.S. would be tightening the 10-year-old sanction regime against the country. The newest sanctions consisted of freezing assets of military leaders and preventing government/military officials from gaining American travel visas. Previous sanctions have consisted of withdrawing military and economic aid, including closing American markets to Myanmar exports. The results have been disastrous, as predicted in the Haas and Sullivan article which cites that negative sanctions lead to “economic hardship…insufficient to force desired political change…costly for innocent bystanders…” and at times even to “strengthening of obnoxious regimes.” America’s negative sanctions have been negated by China’s continuing positive engagement with Myanmar, providing economic assistance in return for hydrocarbon resources that assure China economic security and access to Myanmar’s portion of the Bay of Bengal, giving China international security.
This brings us to the second unlearned lesson: International law (in this case, the Security Council) should not be relied upon. At the same United Nations meeting, Myanmar’s allies, China and to a lesser extent Russia, opposed sanctions, citing that the conflict was internal and had no threat to international security. China’s stance within the UNSC reflects its own relationship with Myanmar and confirms Riesman’s idea that the Security Council reinforces current power structures. Each member of the UNSC has their own idea of inter/national security and so long as that division exists, it cannot be relied upon for effective peaceful solutions.
The idea of the democratic peace theory brings two questions to my mind: first and foremost is the idea that democracies don’t go to war with each other a valid claim, and second has to due with current affairs and if promoting democracy in places such as the Middle East is the right thing for the U.S. to do.
James Lee Ray stated in his article that democracies do in fact cause peace. While in past history there have been limited exceptions to the idea that democracies do not go to war with each other, in recent memory this claim has remained constant as democracies have not gone to war with each other in some time. This fact leads me to believe in the democratic peace theory for the most part, but at the same time there remains a small area for doubt as past history does show exceptions to the claim. Advocates of this theory have a procedural concept of democracy which include competitive elections, civil rights and freedom of the press along with other factors. However, is U.S. intervention and attempts to promote these factors which lead to democratization the right thing to do?
In the article “The Way We Live Now: Democratosis” which was published in the New York times this past week, Noah Feldman eludes to the fact that Americans can’t stop talking about how other countries should democratize like we are which poses the question of if this is in fact the right idea. In his article Mark Peceny attempts to answer this question in making the claim that U.S. intervention can in fact have a positive influence on democracy in target states if done correctly. While there are many factors that go into this he further explains in 16 examples of U.S. intervention that 14 of these states have changed in the direction of democracy one year later. So is this idea of “Democratosis” as Noah Feldman points out the right one? In my opinion if done correctly it seems to be the right idea at the time as the democratic peace theory seems to prove true at the time being.
Democratic Peace Theory states that democracies are less likely to go to war with one another, as well as have conflicts. This theory is founded in the many historical observations outlined in the reading by James Lee Ray that looked at relations between countries during various periods of time. As the evidence shows, democracies are less likely to become involved in major conflict with one another because leaders are held accountable for their actions and most people would prefer peace to conflict. But are countries with differing ideals always going to be able to find a compromise that will prevent conflict even if they are democracies? When I ask this, I think of how Iran has a different type of democracy than the US and how there is a real possibility of conflict between us. Their elections are different than ours, but hypothetically, if they were the same would they elect the same type of leaders they have recently with what people consider extreme views.
Are other factors like culture strong enough to overcome the effects of democracy? I think that a country like Israel will always by threatened by its neighbors because of their cultural, historical, and religious differences, regardless of whether democracy is present in all of the countries of the region.
The theory does have widespread validity, but I don’t think that the correlation is strong enough to put enough credence into spreading democracy to spread peace. A country like Iraq does not look to be peaceful anytime soon even though they are a young democracy. Iran is a “democracy” but is not a peaceful country in my opinion. Cultural differences will prove to be a stronger factor in the Middle East than democracy on the road towards peace.
Atkinson’s basic claim is that “socializing” militarily with the US will likely lead to a confluence (even if slight) in identity. Although Atkinson emphasizes communication between the U.S. and the engaged state, I think that is essentially one-sided dialogue. In positing that foreign military officers who step on our lands learn to internalize American values, she indirectly claims that the adoption of democratic values and norms makes the U.S. a moral leader. Although this might have been true for her data set, I think that this argument doesn’t hold in the years following 9/11. The U.S. may have an advanced system of government, but some of its attending effects -– consumerism, capitalism, materialism, commercialism, etc. -– may well outweigh a state’s desire to “assimilate.” For these reasons, I want to know more about how she arrived at her conclusion. Which states did she examine? Do certain socioeconomic conditions affect the liberalization success rate? Do the acculturated nations adopt certain democratic values and forego the others? It was with these questions in mind that I read John Edward’s foreign policy piece, “Reengaging With the World.” Although he argues similarly for the spread of American ideals, he realizes that this is a long-term goal, not a calculated effect. His objective to “reclaim our historic role as a moral leader of the world” is revealing in his use of “reclaim.” Edward acknowledges that global democratization is a worthy end, but it is also a herculean task that remains unrealized at the present. Instead of assuming a constructivist role for the U.S., Edward lists education, disease prevention, provision of clean water, and humanitarian and disaster assistance as ways to reconstruct ourselves in an international light and regain a position of moral leadership. Thus, before the U.S. can expect to convert other states’ identities or export its values, it must fix its own reputation as a democracy. Above all, support for dictators in some countries contradicts the call for democracy elsewhere -– American norms and institutions are weightless in the face of continued support for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan’s Gen. Musharraf. If, at the present, our noble ideations appear as hypocritical and imperialist on the flip side -– how can we seriously expect other states to willingly conform?
In the article "Development and Democracy," the authors explore how several modern undemocratic governments have learned how to lessen the threat economic development poses to their stability. By denying the public "collaboration tools," such as freedom of the press and uncensored access to the Internet, the article argues, these regimes are able to make it very difficult for their political adversaries at home to coordinate their efforts and increase their visibility to the public.
Controlling access to the Internet is a particularly troublesome task for these governments. Their challenge is to find a balance between access to the global network and their censorship goals.
For example, the Chinese government continues to pour money into their infamous Great Firewall project, designed to censor access to the Internet and monitor the public's Internet use. However, it is relatively easy for a brave person inside China to bypass the firewall and gain access to the Internet in its uncensored splendor.
The ruling junta in Burma employs similar tactics. During the recent protests, many brave people in Burma created and sent information and images over painfully slow Internet connections. The junta eventually decided to close down Internet access to the entire country.
North Korea has chosen to take an isolationist route and deploy a massive private Intranet throughout their country. However, the government has recently been reconsidering this policy due to economic need.
The free flow of information and ideas has always been the enemy of authoritarian regimes. Despite their best efforts, countries that attempt to censor access to the Internet will find their task becoming more and more difficult as Internet and computer access becomes more common in their country. The Internet is needed for their economic survival, but is also a highly effective collaboration tool.
The article by Mesquita and Downs argues that the relationship between economy and democracy is not as clear as was once thought, and that perhaps economic development is unrelated to democratization. Instead, the more important factor in determining democratization, the article argues, are “coordination goods.” These are resources available to the population of a developing nation, such as free flow of information, rights to congregate and communicate etc. The question then is how have authoritarian governments prevented the emergence of coordination goods despite the economic development? One potential answer to this lies in the notion of a resource curse. That is, countries that are endowed with valuable natural resources, such as oil, can avoid democratization. This is possible for a variety of reasons, the main one being that the leaders can use the money derived from oil profits to buy off political dissenters or provide social services for their population with relatively low taxes (or no taxes). This is the best explanation for why governments in the Middle East have so consistently avoided democratization. While in theory, these countries are democracies, they show no real steps towards democratization. China, on the other hand, cannot be explained by the resource curse. While many have cited China as an example of economic progress without democracy, whether or not this remains true is still unclear. China’s economy has still not fully developed in that only a small fraction of the population actually reaps the benefits of economic development. Much of the rural population is underdeveloped and uneducated. In perhaps the most developed part of China, Hong Kong, there have been strong calls for democracy and much upheaval. The recent protests are a good indication of the fact that the stability of the non-democratic regime in China is not a given.
On Wednesday the 10th of October Taiwan held a military parade to show off its military might. They test fired 2 home-made missiles and demonstrated an anti missile defense shield still under development. The point of this parade came about amidst growing hostility between China and Taiwan. The unveiling of the new missiles with a range great enough to hit Chinas mainland was an attempt to balance the scales. China Currently has nearly 1000 missiles aimed at the island. Taiwan now has the capability to strike back if those are launched. This ties in well with the idea of nuclear deterrence. Is China now going to be deterred from using those missiles if it knows Taiwan now has the ability to retaliate? Would China now be less likely to attack Taiwan at all now that its own cities are in danger of attack? Deterrence would suggest yes, that now there is more to loose in starting a war, so one will be less likely.
article at http://www.spacewar.com/ additional article at http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Taiwan_Test_Fires_Cruise_Missile_Capable_Of_Striking_China_999.html
The effect of economic development on democratization is a contested issue. Scholars such as Seymour Martin Lipset have said that economic development creates a middle class with a stake in the system, causing them to create a structure by which they can be heard i.e. a democracy. Because of this it is said that economic development leads to democracy. However during the lecture, the professor stated that Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs were skeptical of this notion and that democracy is not a product of economic development. However, examining the article by de Mesquita and Downs reveals that they do not doubt the idea that economic development creates a middle class with democratic impulses. Their main concern is with states that use the benefits of development to restrict tools of organization to the masses. They do not disagree that left unfettered after economic development, the people would create a democratic state. But even with restrictions on these tools, I believe that economic development would lead to democratization. De Mesquita and Downs use the examples of China to base their argument. However economic development in China is a recent phenomenon that has not reached its maximum capacity. Although China has thousands of protests yearly, they do not represent a wide segment of the population. Most people in China are still engaged in agrarian activity, but once more of the population is brought into the modern economy, more people will have a stake in the government and no matter how much the government restricts the tools of organization, they cannot repress the wishes of a billion people. Therefore struggles for democracy as seen recently in Myanmar are likely to fail at early stages of development because not enough of the population is educated enough to care about the composition of their government.
With the recent topic of democracy and security, one special case stands out - Greece and Turkey. Given the Democratic Peace Theory which states that "democracies never fight each other" (Ray, 34), what explains the extremely high tension between Greece and Turkey? First, Greece and Turkey face a heavy border disputes regarding the Aegean region and Cyprus. Second, both countries are considered parliamentary democracies. Thus, this is a serious matter because Turkey and Greece almost came into armed conflict in the past, like in 1996 over Imia-Kardak. Recently, tensions between the two countries have become strung out again due to the issue of illegal immigrants, with both parties placing fault on the other, as well as pointing to larger issues like their border dispute. This same border dispute used to be a lot worse and involved the military. The Greece-Turkey case provides some evidence that democracies still contain the possibility of fighting other democracies, but we can qualify the case - Greece and Turkey have never gone to war. This may be due to the fact that they both are democracies. Therefore, while it may be the case that democracies may not like other democracies, they still won't go to war with each other. On the other hand, we can see the defusing of their conflicts as the result of entanglement theory - NATO had to intervene some of their disputes in order to prevent military involvement. Since both Turkey and Greece are part of NATO, they had no choice but to comply with NATO's arbitration. Therefore, Greece and Turkey didn't go to war as the result of external forces, not due to their regime type. Either way, the conflicts (and resolutions) between Greece and Turkey are an important area of inquiry regarding the validity of the Democratic Peace Theory.
The recent headlines involving the security company Blackwater have given rise to another point of controversy between Iraq and the US. The fact that the members of Blackwater are exempt from Iraqi law and can skate around international law as well has many other countries and groups within the United States worried about the future dangers of similar security companies. The biggest worry is that this group of well-trained soldiers is not held responsible to any organization and thus its actions cannot be punished if they are found to be in violation of any international law or treaty. There are no incentives for members of these companies to abide by commonly accepted laws while they accomplish their missions on the battlefield. According to an article from bbc.com “… analysts say that without the use of security firms, sustaining ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq would simply be impossible.” Although the United States government is paying the contracts of these soldiers it is tough to entirely place the blame on the government since they do not give direct orders to these soldiers nor are these soldiers bound to the government by an oath like the rest of our conventional soldiers are. So the question becomes is it legitimate to use these types of security firms? What does this do to our credibility when we make demands on other countries (e.g. Iran and North Korea in reference to nuclear weapons developments)? How are these firms different from terrorist groups as actors in the international arena?
National security at the domestic level is often taken for granted and overlooked by issues in the international arena. After watching Dr Strangelove: Or how I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb, the recent Air force mistake of flying nuclear warheads over the continental US has Kubrick-esque implications. A major theme of the movie is the possibility of human error and mechanical procedures leading to nuclear catastrophy. While there was obviously no mistake leading to the detonation of a nuclear warhead, the possibility that a B-52 could accidentally fly over US soil with six cruise missiles armed with warheads has lead to a level of uncertainty in the Air force’s safeguards against such a situation. Much of the readings and discussions in class have dealt with uncertainty’s role in national security. While the uncertainty we’ve discussed relates more to its role in war and conflict, the purpose of national security is to address and remove uncertainty and fear from the general public’s minds. Security, or the feeling of security, dictates government’s actions and agendas. In general, security measures and procedures within the US armed forces are so standard and uniform that the handling of nuclear material is accepted and something with which people are comfortable. This means that the remaining resources are then allocated based on remaining international issues. However, this recent event has called attention back to a basic procedure that was accepted. Much like Kubrick’s film, this recent mistake calls attention to an area of national security generally unquestioned: a nation’s security from its own mechanisms. Matt Scanlan
The New York Times recently reported that the Iranian nuclear negotiator resigned before scheduled talks with the European Union. This has many in the West fearing that Iran may have ended any chance for a possible negotiated settlement concerning its nuclear program. This article seems extremely pertinent in light of the elements of nuclear warfare explored in Dr. Strangelove. In the film, Kubrick highlights the lack of communication between the military and political leaders of the U.S. and Russia to introduce a level of uncertainty that leads to a highly volatile crisis. Each setting of the film (the war room, base and B2-bomber) is an isolated sphere cut off from the outside world. Whether it is Mandrake searching for a telephone to relay the recall code or President Merkin Muffely consoling the drunk Russian Premier, information is compartmentalized and incomplete on both ends. Hence, the last ditch effort to avert the inevitable nuclear apocalypse is a complete dissemination of information to the Soviets- by allowing their ambassador to see the “Big Board.” Thus, the film adeptly explores Schelling’s notion of Brinkmanship and how uncertainty can lead nations to unwillingly commit the final step leading to general war. Ultimately, the fact that the Russians did not disclose information about their doomsday device made its possibility as a deterrent utterly useless, resulting in the fateful rodeo plunge and nuclear holocaust. To return to the current example of the Iranian nuclear targets, it is clearly evident that the loss of negotiations will lead to a great deal of uncertainty regarding the intents of Iran’s nuclear program. With Mr. Ahmadinejad saying “that there was no room to negotiate and that Iran would not back down” a game of brinkmanship without clear “tripwires” will create a sense of fear stemming from unpredictability.
Turkish planes pound rebels along border By VOLKAN SARISAKAL, Associated Press Writer
Amidst recent fears of an eminent invasion of Northern Iraq by Turkish military forces Turkish warplanes and helicopters have recently attacked PKK targets in Northern Iraq. Ironically, the Turkish jets that supposedly attacked the position are American made F-16s. This incident is a representation of increasing hostilities that have driven gas prices up to nearly $90 a barrel threatening the energy security of the United States. Furthermore, an invasion by Turkish forces into Northern Iraq would result in major supply shortages for American troops based in Iraq. The majority of food, water and fuel supplies come from supply lines in Northern Iraq. Turkish military actions could prompt the US to threaten military force in order to protect troops and stabilize oil prices. Unfortunately, the US also fears that Turkish military action could undo any recent progress that has been made in Iraq. Currently, Kurdish territories represent one of the few success stories of the Iraq invasion. Undermining this would be devastating to American interest in the Middle East. If the US fails to back the Kurds it could possibly result in further backlash against American forces. Islamic culture recognizes the importance of loyalty when a person offers you their protection that protection must last until death. Thus, the Kurds and the Iraqi government would feel extremely betrayed if the United States fails to defend Iraq’s northern border. This would aid the current insurgency within Iraq giving Iraqis an increased since of betrayal and more reason to support insurgents. In conclusion, the United States is now entrapped in a situation that could result in a war with Turkey. Thus, the US must analyze the costs and benefits of pursuing military action as a deterrent against Turkish invasion.
The Associated Press reported on October 11 that the country of Turkey attacked suspected positions of Kurdish rebels in Iraq and was moving closer to officially declaring military action against rebels in this country. Since 1984, Turkey has experienced unrest and disruptions as a result of Kurdish autonomy fighting in the southeast region of the nation, near its border with Iraq. Turkish military leaders describe attacks into Iraq as necessary because of the aid given by Iraqi Kurds to those in Turkey. The United States is opposed to these kinds of actions and fear that Turkish intervention in this relatively peaceful area of Iraq will further destabilize the nation. Iraqi officials have strongly replied that any military incursion will be regarded as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. However, in a separate article on October 16 the AP reported that Turkey’s parliament was moving closer to giving the go ahead to raids on Kurds in Iraq. This action not only poses a problem in possible destabilization, but also threatens a key element of the U.S. Security Strategy: Democratic Peace.
As the U.S. continues to try and stabilize the Iraq and touts its new government as a young democracy, a very important factor needed to legitimize their military action in the region is pacification between Iraq and other nations throughout the Middle East. As a NATO ally, and a democratic nation, military action by Turkey against Iraq would contradict the Democratic Peace Theory and the U.S. stance that military action can be prevented by democratization. It is very important for the U.S. to work with Turkey to prevent any military action that will lead to further unrest in the Middle East. In democratizing Iraq, the U.S. must strive to ensure a peaceful relationship between other democracies and Iraq in order to legitimize their involvement in the region.
In recent months Turkey has seen a rise in the frequency and lethality of cross border raids by the PKK. On October 18 a major legislative obstacle to invasion was removed by a parliamentary vote authorizing military action in Iraq. Why has Turkey shown restraint in deploying large numbers of troops and limited its’ actions to cross-border shelling and aerial bombardment and small unit incursion? The Turkish government must consider the costs and benefits of an invasion into northern Iraq to their own domestic stability.
Turkey has conducted large-scale incursions into Iraq from the late 1980s to mid 1990s. During this time thousands died in southeastern Turkey from cross border conflict between PKK and Turkish forces. The Kurds won limited concessions from the Turkish state, and some domestic stability returned. However, sympathy for the PKK among Turkish Kurds remains high. Another large-scale campaign against the PKK runs the risk of serious domestic unrest among Turkish Kurds.
The Turkish public demands action. The military, too, has been hawkish on cross border operations in “hot pursuit” of PKK forces. But the regime seems hesitant and has shown “remarkable restraint” in committing robust and sustained military action. Instead Turkey’s national security council met to discuss the border situation and advised economic measures against groups in Iraq that provide support for the PKK.
Turkish action, thus far, in Iraq has been on a small scale. Limited operations will alleviate domestic and military pressure to act. Fear of wide interstate conflict will galvanize Iraqi, Iraqi Kurdish, and US to build a political solution amenable to Turkish interests. The possibility of a significantly destabilized northern Iraq inflaming Kurdish separatists isn’t a gamble Turkey wants to take. Despite international implications of invasion, the benefits of restraint outweigh the potential cost of widespread domestic instability.
On Wednesday, October 17, in what represents the first strategic collaboration between the Navy, Coast Guard, and U.S. Marine Corps on issues of protecting the U.S. Homeland and national interests at the international level, maritime officials completed the first major revision in two decades to U.S. Naval strategy, a strategy that will hereby be focused on humanitarian missions and improving international collaboration in order to prevent conflicts. According to the Associated Press, this strategy reflects a broader effort by the Department of Defense in working with fledgling democracies and helping them to stabilize by means of aid, training, and other efforts. This strategy was unveiled before naval representatives of 100 countries and was presented to them by the chiefs and commandants of the three services: Admiral Roughead, USN, General Conway, USMC, and Admiral Allen USCG. Although this strategy does not void the importance of a combat power presence in susceptible areas such as the Western Pacific Ocean and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean as a mode of deterrence and to dissuade potential adversaries, the document forsees more international partnerships and a force that will defeat terrorism by winning hearts and minds instead of the use strategies that were more appropriate and effective during the Cold War. The strategy announced by these three branches of the U.S. Armed Forces shows what in my opinion is an active demonstration of a definite effort by the U.S. to promote democratic peace. At the same time, this is also a show of how foreign militaries are being influenced by our own military and how in accordance with the Democratic Peace Theory this document is proposing a more stable world and more widespread peace by means of democracy, however enforced by a military contingency and proaction.
On October 10, the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed a nonbinding vote on H.R. 106 condemning the killings of Armenians in 1915 as genocide. Though it appears that a vote in Congress is a largely domestic issue, H.R. 106 proves how domestic political and international affairs can often collide in very serious ways.
The Turkish government vehemently opposed the vote as it has always denied the genocide, threatening to cut military ties with the United States should the resolution pass. This isn’t mere bluffing or bullying on the part of Turkey, the issue of credibility offers some credence to Turkey’s threat. Turkey cut military ties with France in November 2006 after the French government passed legislation making it a crime to deny the Armenian genocide.
Passing such a resolution would have relatively serious implications regarding national security. Severing ties with Turkey would be damaging to the war effort in Iraq, possibly resulting in a loss of access to ship supplies through Turkey into northern Iraq and a key gateway for the United States military to Iraq. Turkey is the closest NATO ally the United States has to Iraq and passing the vote could potentially cause irreparable damages to that alliance. The NATO alliance serves long-term objectives that further the common interests of member nations and the Bush administration and Turkey have made it explicitly clear that H.R. 106 does not and will not further the interests of either country.
On October 25, most supporters and co-sponsors of the bill backed down. Largely due to the fervent opposition by the Turkish and American governments, foreign policy appeared to trump the efforts. Though supporters claim they will wait until next year for “more favorable timing,” it appears that while many members of Congress were aiming to call attention to the genocide in order to prevent future genocides and stop current ones (i.e., Darfur), the issue of national and military security triumphed in the end.
In February 2007, North Korea finally agreed to close its nuclear reactors in exchange for the fuel aid. Most recently, in October 2007, DPRK also declared that it would close down its other nuclear programs and reactors by the end of this year. Although one can never predict whether North Korea would truly disable its entire nuclear program or not in the future, this is comparatively a significant change in North Korea’s action and attitude - back in 2002 and 2003, nuclear brinkmanship was at its peak. North Korea withdrew from the non-proliferation agreements and the U.S. decided to halt oil shipment to DPRK. North Korea’s long-range missile test in 2006 was a very provocative action, to the international outcry. Since North Korea had begun to build and develop nuclear reactors in the 90s, the U.S. government never declared a war on North Korea. U.S. might have not declared a war on North Korea because of its calculation from such a war - significance of protecting South Korea that is bordering DPRK, as well as diplomatic relationships with Russia and China. North Korea’s comparatively larger armies than South Korea’s armies are one of the factors that could trigger a continuation of the (unofficially ended) Korean war. Also there could be a damage in a diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and Russia, as post-Cold War tension still seemed to have its shadow remained. Thus, as Mueller says, it is not only a militaristic approach and calculation the state takes. U.S. finds it that status quo is better than going on a war with North Korea, considering the diplomatic factors and predicting the potential consequences. Though this absence of war is not necessarily a mark of successful deterrence, still the U.S. finds that peace is substantially preferable to the war - the U.S. government could have raised its estimation of the status quo that it actually let DPRK possess nuclear reactors and programs for almost a decade now, which seems to have come closer to its ending.
"We have information that there has been maybe some studies about possible weaponization, that's why we have said that we cannot give Iran a pass right now, because there is still a lot of question marks. But have we seen Iran having the nuclear material that can readily be used into a weapon? No. Have we seen an active weaponization program? No."- Mohammed ElBaradei, Chairman, United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in comments made at a press conference on 28 October 2007.
Of course, this rhetoric and saber rattling occasioned the spawn of a number of stricter measures, including United Nations-sponsored weapons inspection, carried out under the auspices of UNSCOM, the U.N. Special Commission created specifically for that aforesaid purpose. A number of well respected and prolific persons served this Commission, including patriotic American and former U.S. Marine Corps Officer Scott Ritter, who served as an advisor to U.S. Army General and CENTCOM Commander H. Norman Schwarzkopf during what has euphemistically become known as the ’First Gulf War’. The overwhelming majority of these people, including Ritter, reported that their investigations could prove no existence of Iraqi WMD. Notwithstanding these assertions, the U.S. nevertheless invaded Iraq, and remains a virtual occupier of that country to this day. Even David Kay, the chief weapons inspector for the Bush Administration, himself an early and extremely vocal saber-rattler in making the case eventually acquiesced to the lack of Iraqi WMD. The U.S. clearly had egg on its face, yet it remains embroiled in a deadly occupying action in Iraq.
Fast forward to the present, and, despite popular sentiment in the United States having turned against the Iraqi action, arguably the United States stands on the brink of another armed conflict with yet another Muslim nation- this time, Iran. Some of the players are different this time, but the roles are all the same, with Hussein’s part being reprised by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This time, we’re not talking about chemical and biological weapons, but rather nuclear ones.
The school of realism championed by Morgenthau, Waltz, and others tells us that we must view states as pragmatic actors that will always work to further their interests, and, of course, the interest of the United States lies in preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power. I do not argue contrary to this observation, nor do I suggest that an armed incursion will not eventually turn out to be the most rational and prudent course.
However, I do suggest we take time to reflect on our past mistakes, and to ponder how our actions ultimately serve our own purpose. Perhaps the Iraq conflict has made the United States a safer place; then again, perhaps it hasn’t. It’s worth questioning, in any event.
Embargoes Against Myanmar: Will Their Impact Change Anything?
Two weeks ago, President Bush imposed new financial sanctions against Myanmar, freezing US assets of the military government that brutally cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrators near the end of September. These sanctions built on sanctions against 14 officials, five business executives, and seven companies. In addition, the EU imposed an arms embargo on the nation. These are positive steps taken against the oppressive regime. However, Dominic Tierney questions the effectiveness of embargoes. Although he discusses UN embargoes in civil wars, many of his points are applicable here.
According to Tierney, economic embargoes, such as what the US is imposing, generally affect the civilian population more than the leadership. Over time, they limit the development of a middle class, which undermines growth of civil society, an important component of democracies. Tierney argues that economic embargoes succeed when the target group, in this case Myanmar’s military regime, is dependent on external support, is partly democratic, and has a political culture that is open to changes in policy. Although Myanmar depends financially on good relations with neighbors such as China, these states refuse to cut off lending, investment, and trade, deeply hampering the work of the EU and US.
The only real effect of the embargoes against Myanmar seems to be symbolic. A large swath of the international community has signaled its resolve, which should, as Tierney explains, have the effect of deterring more violence against the protesters. The EU and US have continued their efforts to uphold the norms of nonviolence, democracy, and human rights by isolating the state in violation of these norms. Whether or not this does anything more than give enhanced lip service to these norms is debatable.
A final result of the embargoes is that the EU and US have appeared to satisfy the outcry for action, though in reality, without support from China and others in the region, the effect is negligible at best.
NY Times, Oct 20, 2007, "Bush Imposes New Sanctions on Myanmar" http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/20/washington/20prexy.html
Dominic Tierney, 2005, “Irrelevant or malevolent? UN arms embargoes in civil wars”
The world community has developed an international law system that has done very little to prevent or stop genocide from occurring. The Genocide Convention as passed by the United Nations General Assembly, the International Criminal Court, and the various tribunals set up to deal with the aftermath of genocide are all part of a reactive system that focuses more on punishment than prevention.
The Samantha Power article that we read showed how the world community turned its back on the nation of Rwanda and allowed hundreds of thousands of innocent people to be killed. UN peacekeepers were pulled from Rwanda and nations such as the United States were unwilling to commit their own troops to the conflict. There seems to be little point to a genocide convention if it is not enforced in a way that tries to prevent people from being killed. A tribunal was set up after the killing stopped in order to punish those responsible, but it was probably of little comfort to those who lost their loved ones in the conflict.
The lessons of Rwanda and other past genocides have not been learned. The International Criminal Court began preparing for the prosecution of those responsible for the genocide in Darfur over 18 months ago. The perpetrators of the genocide certainly deserve to be punished. However, it seems strange to prepare for trial while innocent people are still being slaughtered.
The world community should alter how it deals with genocide. The United Nations should be at the forefront of preventing or at least limiting genocide. Unfortunately, there seems to be little hope of this happening. The UN did nothing to help those in Rwanda, it was critical of the intervention in Kosovo, and the death toll in Darfur keeps rising. Humanity deserves a system that will truly try to save lives instead of one that is content with a successful prosecution.
Pakistan has been a risky ally in the War on Terror. After the September 11th attacks in 2001, Pakistan’s leader General Perevez Musharraf pledged to cooperate with US security goals of capturing known and potential terrorist on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Since then, the Musharraf government has received 10 billion dollars in US aid, mostly intended for military purposes. But despite US stated goals of spreading democracy throughout the Middle East, Pakistan remains a military government with weak democratic institutions. While Musharraf has stated his intent in increasing democratic values, the US has much to fear in regional stability due to increased dissolution with the Musharraf government from internal Pakistani factions. On Saturday, November 3rd Musharraf declared “emergency rule,” effectively instating martial law by cutting international television stations, raiding the Supreme Court, and dispatching the police to the streets.
The US government has vocally denounced Musharraf’s power grab for its anti-democratic attack on the Pakistani constitution. It is fair to assume that US hostility toward the declaration of “emergency rule” is also a result of the unknown ramifications in US national security. Musharraf has proven to be a relatively loyal ally, this incident withstanding. With the loss of Musharraf’s leadership legitimacy due to this seemingly desperate attempt to remain in power, US hopes that Pakistan could transition into democracy while still remaining favorable to the US War on Terror could be squashed. Other political factions, including fundamentalists, could potentially gain power through illegal seizures like that of Musharraf or, even worse, gain power if Musharraf agreed to allow continued democratization.
The US is now in a game of alliance politics in which there does not seem to be any one good answer. The threat posed by Pakistan, a nuclear power in the Middle East, means that US abandonment of its ally is impossible and domestic interference is likely. Another US backed military government in the Middle East, like that of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, would be arbitrary and could potentially lead to war in the future. Alternatively, encouraging democratic elections could result in anti-US and anti-War on Terror factions coming to power. At this point, the US has to hope that Musharraf will back down from this martial rule of law, reinstate government institutions, and be a strong leader towards democracy with the hope that these changes will regain trust in the electorate. As of now, Musharraf’s “emergency rule” appears to be another set back for the already convoluted and increasingly complicated US national security objective.
New York Times Sunday, November 4, 2007 “Pakistani Sets Emergency Rule, Defying the US” by David Rohde “Musharraf Leaves White House in a Lurch” by Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Helene Cooper
A recent article published in the Atlantic Monthly looks at the implications of American nuclear dominance on future U.S.-Sino relations, specifically how America's pursuit of strategic nuclear weapons threatens to trigger a new arms race with China. The issues outlined in the article signal a possible return to cold war era brinksmanship and provide a useful case for understanding the calculus of actors involved in a security dilemma.
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has sought to widen its missile gap with the rest of the world. The US has been able to comply with arms reduction treaties such as START II largely by replacing its old nuclear arsenal with a smaller number of more technologically advanced weapons. US military strategists now have at their disposal a nuclear capability of tremendous versatility: missiles of increasing precision (99% hit rate), great discretion in terms of warhead yield (.3 kiloton to 1,200 kilotons), and the ability to detonate "air-bursts" to further limit civilian casualties. Ideally, US strategy serves the duel purpose of both deterring nuclear and conventional attacks while also providing for more flexibility response options in a crisis. In Contrast, China has only a small strategic force of aging nuclear weapons – 80 warheads, of which only a few are ICBMs and none of which are immediately deployable. China's arsenal proved more than adequate during the cold war, but will no doubt be insufficient as China naturally wants to develop military capabilities commensurate with its growing economic stature.
The question becomes: how do we best handle a rising China? Lieber and Press argue that the missile gap and America's nuclear strategy will present a difficult paradox for US policy-makers and military planners–one there is no easy answer for. On one hand, this strategy brings the US greater coercive leverage should there be a crisis over Taiwan (a case the authors detail). But the downside is that China, sensing the erosion of true mutual assured destruction and a creeping US containment strategy in Asia, might feel compelled to ratchet up their own capabilities all the more. On the other hand, should the United States make a good faith effort to reduce such strategic weapons, China might feel less threatened and therefore also less likely to engage in an arms race. This route, too, has its cost though, as both US political and military leadership are faced with giving up tools they already possess—counter-force capabilities and bargaining power–in favor of older, blunt instruments which also potentially more unreliable.
Genocide is one of the greatest human rights offenses imaginable, yet when Genocide does occur, the scale of the carnage is usually beyond fathomable. The death tolls from the Holocaust, Cambodia and Rwanda are all difficult to bear, as are the images of emaciated corpses, mountains of skulls or mutilated remains. If such images and thoughts are appalling to the average human, then this begs the question: why do we allow genocide to happen and why do we not try to stop it? In Samantha Power’s article “Bystanders to Genocide”, she describes the events surrounding the Rwandan Genocide and the US’s failure to intervene in the crisis. She describes the unfolding of the genocide and how, despite multiple intelligence reports warning about the unfolding massacres, little was done to intervene on behalf of the Tutsis. Aside from a few telephone calls warning the Interahamwe leaders that they could be punished for their actions, little to nothing was done otherwise. Today, we see a repeat of what happened in Rwanda. In Darfur, 400,000 are dead, on top of the million who died in South Sudan during the civil war. In Burma, Chechnya and other places around the world, the killings continue. While it may not be 800,000 dead in 100 days as in Rwanda, these are still atrocities that demand international condemnation and action. As Power indicated in her analysis of the Rwandan Genocide, even simple actions, such as jamming broadcasts, raising public awareness or even just giving sanctuary to those fleeing massacres can help curtail the killings. Since 1945, the global mantra has been “never again”, yet again and again the world is confronted by genocide. The next time genocide occurs, and sadly, it most likely will, the international community needs to present a strong and united front and should be willing to go as far as authorizing a sizable force to end the killings. Though the international community has taken some positive steps, such as the AU mission to Darfur, more decisive action needs to be taken sooner to prevent a repeat of the past. Only 5,000 well-armed UN troops would have been needed to save hundreds of thousands of Rwandan lives; isn’t such a small contribution worth it so that we can honestly say, “t\never again”.
On October 10, the House on Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution to recognize the mass killings of Armenians by Ottoman Turkish forces during World War One as genocide. With over half the House in support of the measure, it looked as if the resolution was on its way to approval. Yet, as soon as it passed the Committee, the Turkish government, which denies the existence of the genocide, began threatening the U.S. with serious repercussions. Following this, the Bush administration began putting pressure on the House to suppress the resolution and supporters began backing down. By last week, its primary backers had rescinded their support and the resolution was indefinitely shelved.
Exemplified here is the importance of alliances, threats, and credibility in national security. As a member of NATO and an ally of the U.S. in the war on terror, Turkey has proven to be a valuable asset. Importantly, Turkey allows U.S. goods meant for the Middle East to move through its borders, with a notable 70 percent of U.S. cargo intended for Iraq passing through Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey.
It is likely due to the importance of this alliance that the threats made by Ankara, as well as the withdrawal of their U.S. ambassador, had the intended effect. The reaction of the Bush administration visibly demonstrates that they either believed these threats to be credible or that Turkey’s role as an ally was too important to risk the possibility that they were sincere. Either way, the pressure proved effective, and the U.S. backed down.
Furthermore, the situation reveals that although the U.S. is arguably a more powerful nation, threats were still effective against it. It also illustrates that while being a self-proclaimed defender of human rights, the U.S. assigns an importance to national security that at times allows it to take precedence over issues such as moral credibility.
The topic of humanitarian intervention has been controversial for much of the latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Political scientists, like Samuel Huntington, have argued that there is no moral or legal justification for humanitarian intervention (specifically in the case of the United States). Others have argued that we have a moral duty to prevent genocide and torture from taking place.
In his article on the humanitarian intervention debate, J.L. Holzgrefe offers a definition of the term (humanitarian intervention) that I find to be problematic. He defines humanitarian intervention as "the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations...without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied" (18). I find this definition to be problematic primarily because it is too broad- it can include a potential invasion of Rwanda on one hand, and the ongoing war in Iraq on the other.
Let's take the ongoing war in Iraq as an example. Under the definition that Holzgrefe provides, we can classify our invasion into Iraq as a "humanitarian intervention." Many foreign policy experts at the time of our invasion argued that our aim was to remove a ruthless, totalitarian dictator from power who had been violating the human rights of his people. The definition, however, does not take into consideration alternative explanations or underlying motives for the invasion (i.e. oil, prevalence in the Middle East, etc.)
I would argue that a more appropriate definition of humanitarian intervention must directly address this issue of underlying (other) motives that may define a particular country's invasion of another country. Or else, we are left with no definitional means of distinguishing between a potential invasion of Rwanda and an invaded Iraq.
The book “The War over Iraq” by Kaplan and Kristol identifies the ideology of the Bush Administration as “American Internationalism”; the coupling of “American Power” to American Ideals”. This new approach offers Americanism as a “model for the world”. The ideology calls for the incorporation of the spread of freedom and democracy on a global scale into official national security strategy and redefines the concept of a “threat”. No longer should military aggression be directed exclusively toward threats of imminent danger, but should include those threats posed by opposing ideologies which restrict freedom and reject democracy. I found myself considering this new approach while reading about 2008 presidential candidates’ positions on the War in Iraq. In the 2008 election guide published by the NY Times, candidates were asked whether they felt the war was right to begin with, whether they were in favor of the “surge” of new troops, and whether they felt withdrawal was an appropriate action at this time. As I read their responses, I found myself focusing on the way in which responses were phrased; did they use words like “freedom” and “democracy” when defending the preemptive strike on Iraq? Did they argue that the war was unjustified because intelligence fabricated imminent threats to US security? If so, were these threats shown to be credible, would the war have then been justified? The book “The War over Iraq” shows that a new way of approaching foreign policy has emerged from a combination of threats from non-state actors that cannot be contained within a single border and the reaffirmation of the American dedication to freedom and democracy as an international standard. With the surfacing of this new “American Internationalism”, one must analyze the motivation behind policy decisions and change the way in which candidates are assessed. No longer is the pertinent answer “yes” or “no”, but an explanation of “why”.
In addition to my blog post, I wish to add my overwhelming disappointment in the assignment of this book, “The War Over Iraq”, under the guise of providing a scholarly discussion of current national security issues, when the publication is clearly little more than another example of inaccurate, narrow, and poorly constructed right-wing propaganda. The authors, Lawrence Kaplan (senior editor of The New Republic, an overtly one-sided and pinhole-vista’d publication) and William Kristol (chairman of the right-wing think tank the Project for the New American Century and political analyst for the comically one-sided Fox News Channel) are true to form in their failed attempt to produce an academically viable discussion of the Iraq War. The book provides a blatantly biased interpretation of events by right-wing war mongers whose ideas are exemplary of the cardboard cut-out explanations given by the GOP for the past 5 years. That this text would be provided as an educational tool at a public university is disheartening. Perhaps we should hold our breaths for the assignment of texts by Michael Moore and Al Franken, as they surely embody the same level of “objectivity” seen in the book we have just read.
As September 11 becomes the excuse for all US military actions around the world, it too has become the cry for “American internationalists” such as authors Kristol and Kaplan as they attempt to argue for the Bush administration’s curtailment of international law and human rights conventions by pointing to others who are curtailing those very same laws and conventions. The mantra of this “pot” has been to call the kettle black.
Written in 2003, The War over Iraq sums up the misguided calculations made by the administration and its supporters in defending the rationale for the war, and in predicting the outcomes of the war in Iraq.
In wholehearted support of the Bush doctrine, the book presents the calculations on which the war was based; the vast majority of which have since been discredited. [1] Kaplan and Kristol support an American foreign policy based on what President Bush refers to as “the union of our values and our national interests.”[2] Extending from the American exceptionalist position that the US political system is a model for the world, the “Bush Doctrine” codifies three principles: preemption, regime change and continued American preeminence.
The War over Iraq promotes establishing norms conducive to American values worldwide. It states that the US will do whatever is necessary to “keep [its] military strengths beyond challenge” and limit its “rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”[3]
Beyond the miscalculations and misrepresentations made by the current administration, a threat arises when considering the rising power of non-democratic China and the ensuing competition for scarce resources as well as the rhetoric used by the administration involving Iran. [4]
We must worry when people deny China the opportunity to become a “real strategic partner” or Iran a chance to be ‘normalized’ into the democratic world. Opportunity should exist independent from the blessing of the US.
1. Examples include the presence of WMD’s and proof of direct connections between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda. 2. Kaplan and Kristol. War over Iraq. 2003. 38. 3. Ibid. p 74. 4. See: State of the Union Address. 2006.
Within the pages of The War over Iraq, authors Lawernce Kaplan and William Kristol make an impassioned argument for applying the so-called “Bush Doctrine” to a pre-2003 invasion Iraq. Described as the promotion of central American liberal ideals through the preponderance of American military and economic power, the “distinctly American internationalism” encapsulated within the Bush Doctrine has animated and informed America’s post 9-11 foreign policy, bringing together “the most successful elements of realism and liberalism” to create what its proponents celebrate as “a roadmap for a more hopeful future.”
The Bush Doctrine and its charge to “go forth and democratize” has taken a beating over the past couple of years, given the difficulties and costs of the Iraq occupation and the Bush Administration’s stalled efforts in creating a viable Iraqi democracy. The hopeful future extolled within The War over Iraq, at the very least, has exacted a high price from both the United States and the Iraqi people, and its successful realization is anything but a given reality for Iraq or the region in general.
In the shadow of this doubtful outlook, the Bush Doctrine recently faces a new challenge in the suspension of the constitution and declaration of “emergency rule” Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, in which protests have been outlawed, thousands of dissidents jailed, and military law has been amended in order to prosecute civilians under military courts. Although there have been modest calls by the Bush Administration for Musharraf to end the state of emergency and place elections once again onto the foreseeable Pakistani political timetable, the tone of these declarations have been underlined with a firm sense of realism, which recognizes Musharraf “as an ally America [needs] in the fight against Al Qaeda” and the larger war on terror. It seems George Bush and his administration is now walking a tightrope between the idealism and realism embodied within the doctrine that bears his name. The coming months will be telling in how well the administration is able to achieve this feat and revel even more as to the viability of the Bush Doctrine as a future roadmap to American foreign policy
See the following for some interesting discussions on this issue:
Conventionally, we examine national security questions at the international level of analysis. Yet, when we consider the units we are vying to secure to be individuals, families, and business (instead of government, borders, institutions), domestic upheaval should count as an integral component of national security. Currently in Pakistan, General Musharraf has instituted another state of emergency in the face of escalating domestic pressures that he considers to compromise their (and their allies’) war on terror. Is this movement merely a feign in order to maintain power and a direct military presence in civilian government beyond proscribed constitutionality? Or is it a sincere response to uphold the draconian measures to combat fundamentalist/extremist (and anti-government) groups. We typically place primacy on democratic values. But given the existential implications of national security, many decisions should stay out of the realm of the tenuous predilections of the masses. Many perspectives on the current Pakistan crisis could be considered. I will consider one of them briefly, that is the uncertainty of the US action/influence into its country. As the US continues it War on Terror, Musharraf should rightly fear US action; Pakistan is a strategic nexus for prominent terrorist networks and a vital interest for the US to contain. It has been in US interest to promote Musharraf’s repeated constitutional circumventions in order to suppress and rout said networks. However, if Pakistan fails to evidence that it can do so, it may rightly fear significant US pressure/intervention. The US has conducted isolated missile strikes near the Afghan border and will surely take greater control, as it deems necessary. The prospect of direct US interference/intervention is a direct long-term affront to Pakistani national security, and Musharraf is mindful. This current domestic crisis in Pakistan is about more than democracy and executive constraints, it holds layers of broader concerns about its position and capacity on the international stage.
Upon reading the case for the war in Iraq, as presented by Kaplan and Kristol, and about the Bush Doctrine in general, I was impressed by the logic behind this “internationalist” approach. However, while the doctrine makes sense in the abstract, I wonder about the practicality of this approach. Kaplan and Kristol predicted that the whole operation should be near completion in a year or two, totaling 16-32 billion, with a maximum of 75,000 troops. Futhermore, they see the task of installing a democratic government in Baghdad as “manageable” (Kaplan and Kristol, 98), and they criticize the passivity of the elder Bush and Clinton who realized the potential pitfalls of Iraq. The current President had access to the same information as his predecessors, including Clinton’s war simulations that estimated that 400,000 troops might not even be sufficient (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15570330/), but his idealistic foreign policy stance lead him to war. Clearly, the caution exercised by the previous presidents is now understandable. Another issue that struck me was the authors’ insistence on sacrificing the material well being of Americans for principles. While a noble stance, they assume that the average American citizen cares about all the foreign policy issues that they cite. For example, Kaplan and Kristol criticize Clinton for delinking trade and human rights with China, but do American citizens have a right to better economic status at the expense of Chinese internal policy? Furthermore, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (with Iraq as the far more costly endeavor), have cost the average American family of four nearly 21,000 since 2002 (http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/13/hidden.war.costs/index.html). In a democratic society, is it fair for the government to pursue such lofty and idealistic foreign policy goals at the expense of its own citizens’ welfare?
The deep contrast between Kaplan’s and Kristol’s argument of what a post-Saddam Iraq would look like and the postwar Iraq that Biddle and Fallow problematize is very interesting. The divergence of desired postwar outcomes and present realities begs the question, is the strategy of preemption the culprit of postwar atrophy?
Kaplan and Kristol assert that “We will not have civil war in Iraq… Iraq has not had a history of communal conflict.” Yet, Biddle directly refers to postwar Iraq as a country in the throws of communal civil war. He bases his argument of further escalation of the war— if Iraqitization is implemented— as a result of faction power struggles in both the parliament and the Iraqi military. The fact that it is a communal civil war necessitates military and economic intervention that engage the different factions instead of opting for scheduled troop withdrawal.
Biddle argues that the power of the US military needs to be implemented to change the factions’ incentives to formulate compromises for power sharing. This is a complete turn around from the rosy projections offered by Kaplan and Kristol. They argued that after a few years the cost and required military presence would quickly decrease. Democratization of Iraq was to be, in theory, a smooth transition from an authoritarian to a parliamentary system.
Then there is the argument of preemption. Kaplan and Kristol supported preemption based on the logic that it was paramount to America’s security to strike at Saddam before he could strike back. Since Saddam was an irrational leader deterrence would not work. The argument is too simplistic. The postwar challenges were glossed over. To summarize Fallow’s article, the aversion to “detailed thought about the postwar situation meant facing the cost and potential problems.” Though extensive pre-war analysis presented scenarios that predicted present outcomes, the final plans disregarded these probabilities. The White House chose to embrace the positive over the negative. Choosing to concentrate on the positive, it turns out, was selecting uncertainty over undesired expectations. I would argue that preemption is behind the mindset of “we don’t exactly deal in ‘expectations.’ ” The piecemeal nature of postwar strategy is a direct result of this mindset.
One of the most fundamentally important, yet least understood, developments in security studies in the Post-Cold War era is the profound growth and expansion of the private military industry. This continually developing industry, where firms not only supply the goods of warfare, but rather carry out many of the professional service functions, has wide ramifications for global politics and warfare.
These firms are in the words of industry expert Peter Singer, “the corporate evolution of the age-old practice of mercenaries,” and they convey a dynamic and important trend in the security policy of the United States. While the existence of these firms predates the George W. Bush presidency, there have been two momentous political events that have driven the rise of PMFs (private military firms) during his term. The first, September 11th, created the impetus for a dramatic expansion of aggressive United States foreign policy and the Bush Doctrine as laid out in the 2002 National Security Strategy. This lead directly into the second dynamic, the Iraq War, that has created the largest market share for PMFs in the modern era. The numbers for the PMF presence in Iraq dwarf any past operations. Over 60 firms employ more than 20,000 private personnel carrying out military functions (in addition to the thousands of additional civilian contractors providing reconstruction or oil services). To put this into context, such numbers mean that the private military industry has contributed more forces to Iraq than any other member of the U.S.-led coalition, being nearly equal to all the states excluding the U.S. combined.
The most chilling fact about the expansion of this industry may be its lack of accountability and transparency. There have been sensational news stories regarding events in Iraq; such as the 2004 murder of 4 contractors in the streets of Fallujah (which directly lead to the heavy US engagement there), the role of private interrogators in the Abu Grahib scandal, and the September 16th 2007 shootings by Blackwater USA contractors in Nisoor Square in Baghdad. However, despite media outbursts over these stories and low levels of political unrest, the industry remains essentially unresponsive and immune to international and national laws. This is show best by two basic facts: (1) the Pentagon, the primary contractor of private security contractors in Iraq, does not even know how many private security personnel it employs in Iraq at any given time, and (2) through the war, not a single one of the approximated 20,000 private security personnel have been convicted of a crime as they have been given immunity to Iraqi Law. Does this mean that there are 20,000 angels in Iraq who just happen to be predominantly ex-military forces laden in heavy machine guns and riding in armed personnel carriers? O rather is there some type of legal accountability breakdown?
To adopt an idea from Clemenceau, who famously stated that “war is too important to be left to the generals,” it is now reasonable to ask whether “war is too important to be left to the CEOs of multinational corporations?”
The current situation in Pakistan is troubling to the global community as a whole, and I am especially perturbed by it as an American citizen. President Pervez Musharaf recently declared military rule in the country on November 3 to “fight rising extremism”, but his true objectives are anything but.
By suspending the constitution, curtailing independent media and arresting protesters, Musharraf ensured that his October reelection would not be overturned. His victory was challenged on constitutional grounds by many of his opponents, and the Court was scheduled to listen to their complaints on November 13. However, Musharraf made the State of Emergency declaration before proceedings could begin. As General of the Pakistani military, Musharraf is enjoying the best of both worlds: he remains in power while not having to yield to his adversaries.
Unfortunately, the United States is in a very precarious situation with Pervez Musharraf that has amounted in President Bush not doing much more beyond wagging his proverbial finger. Shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Musharraf supported America’s War on Terror by assisting in the incarceration of numerous al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. This amount of success, though, has not been sustained. Despite financial aid from the US nearing 10 billion dollars, Pakistan has come up dry as of late. While the country has not produced the results the global community has been looking for, the United States Government is deeply indebted to them, and has situated itself in a committed relationship with no apparent end in sight.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Musharraf has made efforts fostering terrorism – both directly and indirectly. In 2006, the president agreed to a cease-fire, allowing militants to regroup. Since, al-Qaeda has resurfaced in Pakistan. Training camps have been established, while numerous suicide bombings linked to al-Qaeda operatives occurred within the nation. In addition, the State of Emergency has indirectly encouraged terrorist activity; Musharraf has allocated resources to thwarting the efforts of lawyers, journalists and human-rights activists instead of honing in on the real culprits.
Going back to the Kaplan and Kristol reading, one could make the argument that the Bush administration is an administration guided by a moral objective. The authors identified the Clintonian "wishful liberalism", that essentially wanted to "wish" problems away with no real direct action; the authors also identified the more realist approach during the Bush Sr. administration. As stated, it is quite apparent that the current Bush administration is one that has a moral objective coupled with the initiative. That is, to use US power to spread democracy around the world. And in doing so, it is using almost unilateral US power to spread democracy. It is not pre-occupying itself with trying to gain the UN's support in completing their objectives. Thomas Barnett, a staunch supporter of the current Iraq War, (I know we were not assigned any of his books, or articles, but he is a very popular author when it comes to this subject, and was one of Donald Rumsfeld's assistants, if I remember correctly...), has stated that it is the United States' RESPONSIBILITY to deploy its military (He uses the term "The Leviathan" to describe the US military...)to global hot spots in the fight against Terror. If this continues to be US policy, that is, to send troops to fight FARC rebels in Colombia, Bosnia, countries in Africa (Nigeria, Sudan) etc., does it currently or will it ever have the resources (economic, political, and military) to continue such a policy? A better question may be: How will the US military respond to constant deployment to global hot spots that may or may not be deemed vital to the security interests of the US by government officials OUTSIDE of any given US administration. The reasoning behind that question is that Barnett states the following question in his book: "How do you fight a super empowered terrorist? With a super empowered and motivated US Marine". That said, is the moral objective of the Bush administration a rational objective, given the fact that "boots on the ground" will be needed? Futhermore, is the "active internationalist" foreign policy a policy that will require more "tying in" (aka bind US domestic security concerns with foreign concerns; as was the case with the current Iraq War) on behalf of any US administration.
When we think of national security issues, we often consider the use of military force as one among several main means of achieving our foreign policy and security objectives. However, while national security debates focus heavily upon discussions of issues such as the efficacy of airpower, the role of nuclear deterrence after the Cold War, cost-benefit calculations, and evaluation of our national security strategy, what is less often discussed is the effect such policy decisions have upon the individuals tasked with carrying them out. Specifically, the discussion that often falls by the wayside is the effect that war has upon individual soldiers, both during and after conflicts such as Afghanistan or Iraq.
While for policy planners, security analysts, academics, and most of the American public, the use of military force is an abstract strategic and political issue, for the individual soldier, war is anything but; regardless of policy objective, war is a highly personal, dangerous, and in some cases, severely debilitating experience.
Abstract policy debates about the “war on terror,” US foreign policy, and the idea of preemptive war, become situations in which soldiers must risk their lives, as illustrated by the Master Chief's lecture last week on his combat experiences. This is a sharp contrast from the debate that occurs from the perspective of the American public and politicians, where the war is measured from a more abstract metric of numbers: the total amount of money spent, casualties, and domestic and foreign public support, and so on.
With that said, the question is, how should the human cost of wars be factored into our future policy decisions? How should the additional costs of wars or humanitarian interventions, such as those associated with long term care of disabled and wounded veterans, be calculated against the policy objectives sought? Such a problem, though perhaps less evident now, is already beginning to crop up; specifically, in domestic news stories regarding the treatment of veterans by the VA system, and in stories of the difficulties Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans face in postwar readjustment. Other news stories also speak of the costs of treating wounded veterans, as well as the effects of undiagnosed psychological or physical injuries from combat. Over time, these issues will create additional costs to warfare that are distinctly separate from the current focus upon military budgetary concerns, material capabilities, and bipartisan politics.
In spite of the often acrimonious debate between the right and left regarding the war in Iraq, both sides should recognize that the use of force in the pursuit of national security, while important for strategic and geopolitical reasons, also implicitly has costs beyond the number of expected casualties or other similar considerations. Similarly, while studies of the war's effects upon domestic public opinion and support, as done by Gelpi, Mueller, and Jentleson, are important and useful, other considerations, as illustrated by The Long Road Home, The War Within, and news stories regarding the effects of the war upon veterans, should not escape our attention.
Two recent New York Times articles highlight how much the feasibility of the Bush Doctrine and neo-conservative influence has declined.
A November 26, 2007 article, "Rice's Turnabout on the Mideast Peace Talks" discussed Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's change of heart regarding American involvement in mediating the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Bush Administration had initially advocated for a limited-intervention foreign policy, believing the Clinton Administration’s pro-active approach had often made situations, including the Middle East peace process, worse. Kaplan and Kristol complicate this view, stating that Bush had also appointed more "internationalist" policy makers such as Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld (who had signed the Project for the New American Century and brought in underlings such as Wolfowitz). They stood in contrast to those, such as then Sec. of State Colin Powell, who believed in intervening abroad only if American interests were at stake. They portray Dr. Rice (even though being part of the Vulcan group) as belonging to the Powell camp. The article, however, implies otherwise, stating that Dr Rice initially sided with Cheney and Rumsfeld's (ironically) non-interventionist stance. Her position has since then changed and she has managed to bring the President to her side. One result has been the recent Annapolis Peace conference. But Dr. Rice's positions had changed on numerous issues over the years, and she has attempted to use her close relationship with the President to counter the influences of the two men who drove policy in Bush's first term: Rumsfeld and Cheney. Numerous times she succeeded in toning down the rhetoric of both men on Iran, North Korea, and even Iraq during the run-up to the war. Though often portrayed as a Bush lackey, the article showed how Dr. Rice's attitudes have changed over the years and how she often disagreed with the tenets of the Bush doctrine and the larger neo-conservative agenda.
A November 28, 2007 article "Defense Secretary Urges More Spending for U.S. Diplomacy" shows how much things have changed at the Pentagon since the days of Donald Rumsfeld. Iraq, state Kaplan and Kristol, "reversed the equation, pitting a State Department that warns about the perils of the use of force against a Pentagon team that believes in its efficacy....To the State Department, Colin Powell has brought his peculiar brand of realism, while to the Pentagon, robust internationalists like Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz have brought their more expansive views of America's global role" (70). In contrast, current Sec. of Defense Robert Gates, in a speech at Kansas State University, called for more funds to bolster "soft power" i.e. economic assistance and diplomacy. He noted that a huge discrepancy exists between the Defense and State Department budgets, $500 billion compared to $36 billion. When it came to asymmetric warfare, military force alone cannot accomplish American goals. Gates urged the creation of a civilian response corps, made up of experts in areas like agriculture, urban infrastructure, law, etc, to work alongside the military to establish stability in places like Iraq. Under Rumsfeld, such policy recommendations would have been considered, as Gates joked, “blasphemy.”
Although Iran still has ways to go before they can build a successful nuclear bomb, the American public has been up in arms over the mere fact that an unstable Middle Eastern country may have nuclear weapon technology. Iran claims that its nuclear program is peaceful and only to be used for energy purposes, but the US still believes that Iran’s goal is to build a nuclear weapon. The United States as well as other great powers has turned to the United Nations (UN), United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) to help discourage the Iranian nuclear program. Recent reports (12/03/07) say that Iran is not in a rush to produce nuclear weapons but many still believe that Iran is a serious threat (CNNpolitics.com).
Why is the hegemonic power of the world, the United States, having such difficulty in preventing Iran from developing nuclear technology? This situation is a product of the time we are living in and the results of bad policy decisions on the hands of the Bush administration. Nuclear technology has become an even stronger commodity in the 21st century. Possession of nuclear technology enhances international prestige, provides better security, and gives a country more bargaining power when it comes to dealing with the advanced nations. The invasion of Iraq has also played a negative role in the efforts to prevent countries from developing nuclear technology. Counties that possess nuclear weapons do not get invaded because the risk of nuclear warfare would be extremely likely. Iran understands that and fears that they will eventually become the next Iraq, which is why they have been so adamant in developing nuclear technology.
What can be done? Unfortunately at this point not much can be done, especially under this administrations questionable policy decisions. America can only hope that the US and other dominating nations continue to engage in diplomacy with Iran and the new administration in 2008 comes up with an enticing deal that leads to the halt of a possible nuclear weapons program in Iran.
Iran and the United States: The Emerging Security Paradigm in the Middle East
As the Presidential elections near, it hard to avoid the topic of the Iran and the growing threat of nuclear proliferation. A recent US intelligence report said that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. "The prospect of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons has been a major concern for both regional and international powers." Iran continues to argue that its nuclear program is only for domestic purposes. That is why the release of this intelligence report is both encouraging and scary. Earlier in the semester we talked about the US sharing its intelligence with other countries because we have the most sophisticated tools and money to compile this information. After our faulty reports about WMD's in Iraq it is hard for the international community, let alone the American public beleive these new intelligence reports. With the failure of the US to restore political and military stability, Iran has become a regional leader. “It is Iran, not the United States, that is the most influential ‘exter-nal’ power in Iraq, with an unparalleled ability to affect stability and security across most of the country.” Not only is Iran still a dangerous threat to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but they remain a major influence on how Iraq is going eventually stabalize. Deterrence no longer seems to be applicable to Iran, and the US needs to realize that sanctions are not working and new measures need to be taken.
The house passed a bill banning waterboarding by the CIA but President Bush has already signaled he will veto it if it makes it to his desk. Bush’s argument (we all probably know it by heart at this point) is basically that limiting the techniques available makes it harder to track terrorists and stop terrorist attacks. I personally don’t buy that, but, I think that there are important secondary implications of the poor treatment of detainees that the Bush administration is missing, especially if you take “Occupational Hazards,” the article by David Edelstein, seriously. One of Edelstein’s major points is that for an occupation to succeed the occupying power must maintain its stamina, part of which means the people of the occupying power must maintain their support of the occupation. The occupied power must accept the occupiers as legitimate as well, which means they probably have to see the occupiers as “good guys.” Harsh tactics like this severely damage the image of the United States not just in Europe but in Iraq and in the U.S. itself. As a result, domestically, this feeds disillusionment in the U.S. moral character and in the rightness of anything that we do, making people less likely to support the war. In Iraq, people see the U.S. behaving horribly and logically they won’t be particularly inclined to support the occupation forces. Even assuming that torture actually does work better than more restrained techniques (which, again, I have doubts about), formalizing and basically declaring to the world, especially to the peoples of America and Iraq, that we’re OK with something just about everybody else considers torture severely damages our chances for success. If drives away hearts and minds. We can’t possibly win (whatever it means to win) in an environment like that.
Iraqis say US must engage with Iran for Mideast security
In light of the recent U.S. intelligence reports that states that Iran suspended nuclear weapons development under international pressure in 2003, the United States must now be very careful as to what action they plan on taking with Iran within the near future. Toby Dodge’s proposal of the U.S. taking note of how international pressure can influence Iran and substitute hardline rhetoric with higher level of diplomatic engagement, seems like good policy in the near future. It seems that our current policies are not creating open channels for discussion between Iran and other Middle Eastern countries to the extent they should be open. Iraqi National Security Adviser Mouwaffak al-Rubaie's call for engagement with Iran is very much needed. Iran and Iraq could one day live in peace together and both be friendly with the United States but there must be open diplomatic discussion and possibly provide Iran with positive sanctions in helping create peace accords and treaties with Iraq and with its neighboring middle eastern countries. The United States raise its level of engagement needs to directly hold talks with high-level Iranian officials to ask important questions such as why it is continuing its uranium enrichment programs if there nuclear weapons development program has been suspended? For the security of Iraq and the Middle East overall, the United States can not play hard ball and hold out on talks for much longer or else Iran could single handedly erase much of the work and money that the United States has put into Iraq and the Region.
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Risk, Force and Reputation - As exemplified in the current conflict in Iraq.
The current campaign in Iraq can be seen as a classical example of an international actor (US government) seeking to maintain its reputation for invincibility after a formidable attempt to terrorize its population (attacks of 9/11/01). Taking a rationalist/realist point of view, the current and ongoing operations of US armed forces in Afghanistan and Iraq can be viewed as a rational choice to sustain America's stand as the world's sole hegemonic power. It is far fetched to believe that the masterminds of the 9/11 attacks intended to directly take the role of the world's superpower. However, by successfully removing Saddam Hussein out of power (A long nemesis of the west) and gaining control of one of the world's fastest growing human population (Afghanistan), the US government has accepted risks (over 3000 soldiers killed, hundreds of billions in military spending) that would in turn maintain its status and deter others from attempting to change the current balance of power.
One can argue that the current Iraq campaign is an ‘Indirect Preemptive Attack’. It is difficult to argue that Saddam’s regimes posed a serious threat to the US and its citizens (or US interest for that matter), as often is the case however, that the benefits of a preemptive attack are never fully appreciated. By not initiating a ‘Campaign Against Terrorism’, a potential enemy of the US could assume that an attack from his side would draw a reaction from the US government that would be considered acceptable considering the circumstances. By ‘Overreacting’ to the 9/11 attacks and eliminating threats that were not serious threats in the first place (Hussein), the US government lays out the risks one aggressor have to consider when planning to carry out an attack.
On August 2007, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was released, “Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive.” The purpose of the NIE is two fold: first, the Estimate means to connect intelligence with the policy community and two, the Estimate means to provide a coherent analysis that contains “the best, unvarnished, and unbiased information.” The reports in some ways mirrors the President’s national security strategy introduced March 2006. Have we been enlightened about national security with this latest report?
The NIE is an important document. It provides government and US citizens alike a better idea of national security efforts. It is accessible to anyone. You are cautioned, however, that the report is merely an estimate and it does not predict. The proponents of the NIE know the level of uncertainty in the “war against terror.” Yet, there are a few things we do know.
We know that US threats are no longer domestic, home-grown or imported. After the President declared war on Iraq, we faced immediate national concerns—the safety of American troops and the safety of helpless Iraq citizens. We know that the character of this war is not the same as in previous wars. In the past, we fought after direct provocation. Today, our enemy is not Iraq, it is Al-Qaeda—stateless and without boundaries. We know that security concerns are now embedded in what many policy makers and military leaders call an all-out civil war in Iraq. We know that the US is attempting to establish democracy in a foreign land and the US military is overseeing the process. We know that this is something different and something new. And there is large level of uncertainty in all of it. So are we keeping the best national security interests in mind?
Thomas Schelling asserts the rather Realist notion that the unpredictable and uncertain nature of foreign relations leads to the international system being one of “risk taking, characterized…by tests of nerve”. The actions of Russia in recent months are a brilliant example of this opinion of world politics in action. This nation’s loss of prestige and influence following the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union coupled with its own internal economic and civil strife led it to take a much less assertive position in international affairs in recent years. However, as recent news reports indicate, President Putin is trying to regain some of Russia’s stature by indicating a greater willingness to risk confrontation with the west, both militarily and diplomatically.
Evidence of this recent rise in confrontation and assertiveness is not only evident in the high profile conflict with Great Britain over the assassination of Litvinenko, but in more recent military maneuvers as well. The BBC has reported on the Russian decision to resume strategic bombing runs (leading to one conflict with British fighters) as well as publicly testing the largest non-nuclear bomb in existence and recently staking its’ claim to the Arctic seabed in hopes of extending its grasp on natural resources.
All of these actions present a direct challenge to US national security policy because of Russia’s strategic position in the UN as well as their ties with certain countries, like Syria and Iran, that the US is trying to marginalize for security reasons. The biggest security threat to the US comes from not knowing when the interests of a more assertive Russia will conflict in a non-negotiable manner with our own, or when the simple actions being taken to indicate strength may spiral into a more serious situation, as with Great Britain and the Litvinenko incident.
J. Ann Tickner puts forth a critique of Francis Fukuyama's foreign relations piece, "Women and the Evolution of World Politics" by arguing that Fukuyama is disingenuous in his discussion of women in national security and foreign relations. He contends that women and men are biologically different in the ways they think about and react to violence, war and aggression. Fukuyama believes that these aspects of women’s genetic identity will largely determine their behavior as heads of state. He goes on to imagine the characteristics of a world in which women were the major stakeholders, but it is to this hypothetical that Tickner objects. She argues that Fukuyama’s discourse distracts from the real objectives of feminist international relations, which focuses more on the need to disassemble patriarchal norms that dominate concerns of national security and foreign relations. It is nearly impossible to ignore Senator Hillary Clinton in this discussion, as she poises herself as the frontrunner Democratic candidate for President. As the campaign begins, Clinton is facing the question of gender from the media and voters. This gender-specific rhetoric is often aimed to highlight the biological differences between women and men, and contributes to the discourse that Fukuyama explored in his piece about women’s role in international relations. Clinton is viewed as a woman candidate, an identity she embraces, but one which she is careful not to let consume her campaign. In a recent debate, Clinton was asked how she responds to such criticism that portrays her as “unsatisfactorily feminine.” In response, Clinton admitted she was running as a woman (to which she received laughter and applause) but that she is not running because she is a woman. She went on to talk about her experience and skills, neglecting to bring up the gender issue again. In this way, she is attempting to make her gender a non-issue, and more of a supplementary characteristic that will help, not harm the office. In this way, she is applying the tenants of Tickner and choosing to challenge the discourse that makes Fukuyama’s notion’s of gender difference irrelevant.
It is also interesting to note that, in a recent poll of all voters, 28% found Clinton to be the best candidate to deal with national secutiry concerns, with Giuliani in 2nd with 20% of voters. So...how much is Clinton's gender really affecting voter's perceptions of her credentials and ability? What does this all mean in either Fukuyamar Tickner's thesis?
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/washington/16diplo.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper&oref=slogin
In a speech given by President Bush, questions were raised regarding the level of intervention that the United States would be willing to participate in terms of what is going on in the country of Iran. Increasing violence in nearby Middle Eastern countries has Iranians worried that the United States will begin military strikes in their country. While some are advocating diplomacy, others in his administration are slyly pushing for the use of force instead. It seems as if the machinations of politics and the networking of information across political institutions are more calculated, important and deliberate than ever before. This is why Bush’s statements regarding national security and policy are so scrutinized, since many times the rhetoric of politicians may be more manipulative than their intended actions.
Shelling’s assertion that there are three major historical stages to consider when assessing how people and militia interact in warfare needs to be reassessed in terms of the new issues of terrorism. The fine line that delineates what is acceptable in terms of what is fair game within warfare needs to be examined. Terrorism in a post-9/11 world directly bases itself upon the notion that no-one can be safe from the violence of war. The study of national security thus has to change as well, so many of the principles in Arms and Influence are still relevant, but there also a need for a more specific examination of the unique issues of modern warfare.
The different types of victory discussed in the 9/12 lecture are also related to these interactions between countries: if there is no declared warfare, how does a country win or lose (such as in this case between the United States and Iran)? If terrorism does not have these classic boundaries, then what will the measurement be for success or failure in terms of policy and actions?
-Stephanie Nagy
In Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling talks about war in the sense that the capabilities and threats of foreign actors matter more than the actual act of war. He introduces the idea that uncertainty acts to make threats credible. Such is the case in the U.S. war in Iraq. When a hegemonic superpower goes to war against a much smaller terrorist network, the level of uncertainty rises immensely. In a war like this, diplomacy and negotiation is so rare that all threats are seen as legitimate, which causes states to rush into action. It seems like every day the news is reporting on why the U.S. should not have gone to war in Iraq and that we are fighting a war destined for failure, but after reading Schelling’s book it became clear to me that the amount of uncertainty in the equation changed the “chess game” we were engaged in. The U.S. was forced to make an assessment of how willing we were to take the risk of not going to war depending on the threats we faced at that time. It may not have been an overly ambitious and aggressive administration that drove us into a 6-year long foreign fight, but the extreme uncertainty of the situation. Although one may not agree with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Schelling’s arguments make you wonder if we were better off being safe than sorry.
Last week, General David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq, told Congress that the Bush administration’s strategy would remain the same. He believed the war was going well and the U.S. was making tangible progress. This relates perfectly to our class discussion about the perceptions of victory. Although the war in Iraq is far from over, one can still wonder about its outcome. There will always be disagreement about the war’s success or failure on the level of individuals, but what will the overall assessment of the war in Iraq be? If it is widely seen as a victory, then what kind? It is hard to tell even that because there are so many theories about why the U.S. went to war in the first place. Unless the intentions are specifically stated, it is hard to say whether we achieved core aims or achieved an optimal policy. An article in the Sacramento Bee Forum section entitled “Predictions of success” , talks about General Petraeus’ speech to Congress and says, “Once again, we have a general repeatedly promising to save Western civilization by turning the corner in yet another intractable and unnecessary foreign war.” Using the word unnecessary just proves that the aims of the United States in the war in Iraq have not been made clear to the general public, who in most cases are the ones doing the “score-keeping”. I think it is imperative that a government make very clear to the citizens exactly what the aims and goals of that institution are in going to war because war is never merely between governments; it affects every citizen of that state. I do believe that “Of war men will ask its outcome, not its causes”(Seneca), but the outcome can only really be fairly judged depending on its causes.
Iraq, Coercion and Disapproval
President Bush recently declared that he plans to withdrawal troops from Iraq and place them into support rolls rather then frontline combat positions. This move by President Bush as based on his belief in a policy he calls “return on success”. As of Sept. 12th 65% of Americans disapprove of President Bush’s handling of the “situation in Iraq”. 1 Thus, one can conclude that the President is desperately trying to gain popular support for a war that is increasingly unpopular. 2
Thomas Schelling offers tremendous insight and wisdom that relate to the current Iraq crisis. He states that the importance of coercion within military conflict. Currently, this coercion comes in the form of “latent” violence committed by insurgents in Iraq. The current death toll in Iraq is minimal in comparison to most military conflict but the pain inflicted by such violence exploits America’s value for human life. Thus, “it is not the pain and damage itself but its influence on somebody’s behavior that matters.” 3 This coercive “latent” violence has forced incredible amounts of “hurt” and “pain” upon the American people and subsequently low approval ratings of the Iraq war. Thus, President Bush is forced to redefine the parameters of military victory and success within Iraq in order to regain public support. Yet, the United States abides by a set of values that restrict us from waging brutal violence upon civilian populations. When confronted with guerilla warfare the most powerful military in the world cannot use unrestricted violence as a means to hurt and coerce the enemy into submission because of unwavering values held by the American people. In conclusion, Schelling demonstrates that coercion in the hands of terrorist can be used to inflict unimaginable amounts of pain in the face of tremendous military might.
Success Allows Gradual Troop Cuts, Bush Says
New York Times, Steven Lee Myers and Carl Hulse
Washington, Sept. 13th
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/14/washington/14prexy.html?n=Top/News/World/Countries%20and%20Territories/Iraq
1 Associated Press-Ipsos poll conducted by Ipsos Public Affairs. Sept. 10-12, 2007. N=1,000 adults nationwide. MoE ± 3.1., http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm
2 Success Allows Gradual Troop Cuts, Bush Says, Steven Lee Myers and Carl Hulse, September 14, 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/14/washington/14prexy.html?n=Top/News/World/Countries%20and%20Territories/Iraq
3 Arms and Influence, Thomas C. Schelling, The Diplomacy of Violence: 2,4,6
The United States, Pakistan, and the War on Terror
Security cooperation with non-European states has always been a tense issue for the U.S., due to the (sometimes) overbearing proliferation of American values and policies. This is especially evident in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, where a poll taken on 9/11/07 shows that al-Qaeda has a 43 percent approval rating and that 66 percent believe the U.S.-led War on Terror is motivated by anti-Islam sentiment.[1] Pakistan, under President Pervez Musharraf, has been an irreplaceable ally in the fight against terror due to the shared border with Afghanistan and symbolically as a Muslim-majority state (not unlike Saudi Arabia and Egypt during the First Gulf War). However, Musharraf is increasingly unpopular within his own country.
From the U.S., Musharraf has been able to gain an abundant amount of money and diplomatic support because of his efforts against Islamist extremists. Nevertheless, this year, Pakistan experienced several political shifts, all of which have served to weaken Islamabad’s legitimacy. As a result, the U.S. continues to struggle with its policies towards Pakistan, which preserves to alienate the Pakistani public in favor of Musharraf and the military.
The U.S. should be developing an alternative policy aimed towards forming a partnership with the Pakistani people, not Musharraf. Although he remains the safe bet, expert analysis shows that on a whole, Pakistanis are moderate Muslims: Islamic extremism thrives only when the country is under military rule. Recent political negotiations on government power sharing have been held between the Pakistani president and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto – all without the consent of the voting public.
A stable Pakistan is a democratic Pakistan – that much is known. The only thing now is for Washington to explicitly support a civilian government that is chosen by the Pakistani people.
[1]. http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/09/11/poll.pakistanis
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner statement “we must prepare ourselves for the worst” addressed Iran’s continued defiance of the issue on nuclear materials. Though these remarks may be nothing but an empty threat, the idea of using force or the threat of force in diplomacy is nothing new. Iran was angered by the remarks but still continues it civilian nuclear program against growing international pressure. Former commander of US forces in the Middle East General John Abizad commented by asking for continued international pressure and added "I believe the United States, with our great military power, can contain Iran" somewhat echoing Kouchner and past remarks.
With the Iranian issue of nuclear material, constant tension along the Israel-Palestinian border, and terrorism being some of the major issue in international news it seems that diplomacy or soft power is weakening, making the use of force more feasible. Force “the greatest persuader in international relations,” maybe the only means of achieving goals especially in the face of continued defiance and reluctance. Iran still continues its program despite numerous sanctions imposed by other nations somewhat resembling Iraq before the invasion. What makes this interesting is the actual presence of nuclear material for peaceful means but the probability of converting them to nuclear weapons considering Iran’s goals in the Middle East and remarks toward Israel are high. The question is how much longer will the international community wait before arms are taken up. Even though Iraq and Afghanistan are unresolved, this does not mean that war will not happen. Other states have mentioned that military intervention has always been an option and because of the adverse attitude Iran has with the West and constant instability in the region, diplomacy may exhaust itself making war a reality.
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/09/18/france.iran/index.html?iref=newssearch
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/22/AR2007092201353.html
The Washington Post reported today about a high-level diplomatic conference for the nations most effected by the Iraq War. Probably the most important delegate at that conference was the Iranian Foreign Minister. His country's interest in ended the war is strong, but his country's relations with the War's largest proponent (the U.S.) have been strained by negative sanctions and harsh words. As Ninic points out in THE LOGIC OF POSITIVE ENGAGMENT, this has not had the best of consequences.
But Iran is not the perfect example of the ill-effects of negative sanctions and the possibilities attached to positive sanctions. The European Union has, for some time now, been an advocate of positive sanctions in dealing with Iran and has offered many carrots if Iran will stop its nuclear program; the enrichment of uranium continues. While I have no doubt that positive sanctions can go a long way at reforming countries, it seems apparent that there are situations outside of their reach. Iran is a perfect case in point.
All sources of power in Iran currently believe Western Values are wrong at the very least. When diplomacy with Iran happens, it happens with the shadow of that fact. No matter who is represented from a Western-style Democracy, the Iranian government sees their motives as originating from a foolish or perverse place. All relations with them, including positive and negative sanctions, are viewed with this in mind. The only reason for Iran to accord with an offer is when it fits into their interests, which they define and can redefine. The only way to make Iran a viable negotiating partner, is to bring them into the western world by unconditionally dropping all current sanctions against them and letting them experience, as a nation, the positive effects of our life style.
I don’t think that Iran perceives all sanctions—positive or negative—as “foolish or perverse” simply because they originate from the West. While there is tension, mistrust, and an incontrovertible conflict of interests in the nuclear issue, I agree that compromise and positive sanctions still have a place in the matter; Nincic proposes a “tit-for-tat” arrangement whereby the US would reward Iran if it could provide evidence of nuclear responsibility (334). In a recent interview, Ahmadinejad asked, “why Iran should stop an activity in which the United States and Britain were also engaged” (1). I think that the spirit of compromise (which is arguably absent on both sides) must be apparent if Iran and the US are to deem each other, as you say, viable negotiating partners.
In addition to his emphasis on the importance of positive sanctions and the ineffectiveness of negative ones, Nincic also explains that carrots are more effective when the “rogue regime” is experiencing unstable equilibrium domestically. In reference to the penultimate post, I think that the use of force to resolve issues with Iran would be counterintuitive in more ways than one: apart from the obvious consequences of using force (death, destruction, intensifying the anti-American sentiment in Iran and potentially across the globe), the use of force would severely complicate the prospect of using ANY sanctions with Iran in the future (positive or negative) by further consolidating this aforementioned equilibrium.
Just to further complicate this issue, how does Nincic's positive-sanction paradigm shift when the “rogue regime” acts independently of a sovereign entity? How would a country like the US (especially given the degree to which it is entrenched in anti-terrorist rhetoric) offer sticks to actors that operate outside of (or across) state boundaries, that are not formally integrated into the economy/ mainstream, and who have essentially zero accountability when it comes to responding to commitments/sanctions?
(1) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6992266.stm
(2) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7009731.stm
-C.B.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119058379935336609.html?mod=world_news_whats_news
“U.S. Accuses Iran of Arms Smuggling” – Security Cooperation
On Saturday, U.S. troops were hit by surface-to-air missiles that uses an infrared guidance system in eastern Baghdad. An American soldier was killed and others were wounded when the EFP hit their patrol. The US military accused Iran of smuggling surface-to-air missiles and other advanced weapons into Iraq for use against American troops. It was believed that Iran smuggled weapons to Shiite militias in Iraq.
U.S. troops arrested an Iranian in the Kurdish city. The officials believe that he is a member of the elite Quds force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards that smuggles weapons into Iraq. This happened while the Iranian President Mahmous Ahmadinejad was at New York to address the UN General Assembly. The man arrested, Mahmudi Farhadi, had been invited to Iraq and had been cleared by Iraq. The Iranian President condemned the Iranian’s arrest and said he would like to clear things up.
Perspective to the Iraqis, it was not right to arrest Muhmudi Farhadi because of suggested ties by the US. It was not surprising that the US reacted this way because of security reasons but arresting without cooperating with Iraq and Iran should not have been done. It is very important for security cooperation, for each side expects the other to provide security for each other unless they want the relationship between them affected.
Iranian President, Mahmoud Amadinejad, addressed the U.N. on Tuesday, and declared the issue of Iranian nuclear development “closed” to further debate and negotiation. This is most likely in response to recent actions taken by the U.S. aimed at increasing the pressure on Tehran. Thus far, the U.S.’s strategy for engaging Tehran has emphasized the use of disincentives, including economic sanctions and the threat of violence. But why does the U.S. pursue its policy of disincentives with Iran, while it has reoriented its engagement strategy with North Korea to one of positive engagement? As Baldwin mentions in his article, “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” the effectiveness of these two different strategies of engagement and how the target regimes respond to them is dependent on where Tehran and Pyongyang’s baseline expectations lie.
When the Bush administration came to power in the U.S., they reversed the previous administrations policies of positive engagement with North Korea, saying it was rewarding bad behavior and creating incentives for further infractions and misbehavior. Withholding these rewards was viewed as punishment by North Korean leaders because their expectation was they would receive such benefits. This baseline expectation has not changed in North Korea, which is why the only way to move forward in the six party talks was by offering North Korea a few carrots in return for its cooperation. Eventually, it may be necessary to offer concession to Tehran for similar cooperation. For now, however, Tehran does not yet have a baseline expectation for receiving rewards. Its current expectations are for avoiding violence posed by the U.S. threat, and withholding this punishment can be viewed as a reward for Tehran’s cooperation. This strategy may be limited in the long-run, but it is enough to keep Iran engaged in negotiations. In other words, the debate over Iran’s nuclear development is not “closed.”
Just one hour ago, the AFP reported Bush authorized $25 million in oil aid to North Korea (NK) for complying with the “Initial Actions” Agreement in which nuclear reactors in NK were opened to international inspection and shutdown in February 2007. The Six-Party Talks currently being held in Beijing aim to stop all NK nuclear programs by 12/31/2007. Critics have objected that the US is being “gullible” by expecting NK to keep its word.
However as David Kang points out in “The Debate over North Korea,” both the US and NK seem to have credibility issues. In 1994, the US and NK signed the Agreed Framework in which the US promised to provide two light-water reactors by 2003 and formal security guarantees. In exchange, NK would freeze its nuclear reactors and allow international inspection. However, as Kang points out, the US was four years behind schedule in providing the reactors. Also, the US never offered formal security guarantees, and rather publicly maintained that use of military force against NK was still an option. NK, unsurprisingly, abandoned the agreement to restart its reactors and expel inspectors in December 2002.
I believe the underlining problem here is that both parties started off on the wrong foot, ruining their credibility and setting a precedence of irresponsibility. Therefore many of the negotiations that came between the US and NK after the meltdown of the Agreed Framework proved to be frustrating. Victor Cha argues that NK was at fault because it “completely broke” out of the Agreed Framework by restarting its reactors, while the US merely showed “negligence in implementing” its promises. Isn’t neglecting to implement a contract basically breaking it? The US, by failing to keep its word, demonstrated to NK that it was not truly willing to engage. Cha also argues that the US should further “isolate” NK. Honestly, how much more isolated can NK get? Today, by attempting to bring NK out of isolation (a state it desperately wants to escape), the leaders of the Six Party Talks made a smart move. Hopefully all sides can keep their promises this time and set a much needed precedence of credibility.
Victory, engagement, national security – all these concepts have been deemed untidy. Yet, in attempts to clarify such notions, discussions have been limited to questions and dynamics on the structural level, and how state dynamics narrowly influence foreign policy. Waltz’s parsimonious theory of realism most likely accounts for such inclinations towards structural level discussions, yet one must beg the question: What about EH Carr’s argument for a balance between pure realism and utopianism (utopianism, defined here as accounting for the common man, and not just states as THE level of analysis)? Victory, engagement, and national security – all these concepts influence policies that are in reaction to and effects of state dynamics, but what IS the “state”? States, ultimately, are made up of people. Foreign policy-making and questions of international relations all have real and ultimate consequences on the people (the human cost of war, for example); likewise, the people have real impacts on the policy that offsets international interactions. At the cost of beating a dead horse, the War on Iraq is a perfect example of how the domesticity affects foreign policy making and international questions, arenas traditionally limited to “state” autonomy and authority. While 9/11 spurred the American domesticity - and the sympathy and support of other domesticities – to embark on a path of war, the more recent domestic backlashes against the War on Iraq are likewise beginning to bring to bear challenges to foreign policy, as well as changes in international opinion. In the New York Times today, one of the front-page stories (at least on their website) documented soldiers’ current experiences on the “battlefield.” One soldier talked about how his 2-year old daughter doesn’t know who he is because of his long deployment in Iraq. Real consequences/stories like these – with the help of domestic dynamics such as the media - mobilize and enable people to affect domestic decision-making processes, undoubtedly. It was the stories of 9/11 that largely guided our course of action. Furthermore, in light of the Democratic Peace Theory, US political leaders are accountable to their publics. My point in this discussion is not simply “political,” but to point out that international relations questions beg representation of what is actually happening on the ground. So, to ask the same question Wolfers asked: Does national security necessarily only entail hard national security interests? Moreover, to emphasize one of Mandel’s points: According to whose perspective does victory matter? Domestic publics are too large a force to be left out of discussions of national security.
The logic of positive incentives seems relatively intuitive to me. In order to start a beneficial relationship between two parties it seems natural that one must make the first generous gesture in order to establish trust and encourage cooperation. Nincic and Baldwin are very clear in addressing the possible gains that could be had from using these positive sanctions in dealing with “renegade regimes”. However, I wanted to pose the question of whether there are negative externalities to applying positive incentives to countries which are acting in ways which either the international community or individual nations find dangerous or inhumane. Iran’s relationship with the United States would certainly be a contemporary example of a corrosive association which needs to address the dilemma of sanctions and incentives.
These two countries seem so ideologically opposed in the areas of nuclear proliferation, Israel’s sovereignty, women’s rights, and historical understandings it seems almost impossible to propose a systematic method of developing some sort of reconciliation. However, if the tactic of positive incentives is so intuitive, why hasn’t the U.S. employed this strategy? Furthermore are there any dangers to offering positive sanctions to Iran? Snyder briefly mentions that positive engagements can come across as a weakening of one’s resolve and embolden an adversary. I would also add that positive sanctions may send a message to other nations who may attempt to “freeride” on the benefits of such policies and hypothetically pose themselves as a threat in order to demand the same treatment. Lastly, the word incentive, to me, implies that an action must be taken in order to earn or deserve the positive treatment; and if the requirements of the positive incentive are not met, and the reward is taken away, that creates another set of complications where what was once meant to be a positive gesture now has turned into the proverbial “stick”.
Two weeks ago, Buddhist monks took to the streets of Rangoon to protest dramatic increases in fuel prices, and more symbolically, the military junta that has ruled for over fifteen years, leading to a crippled economy and flagrant human rights abuses. Nearly every article on the demonstration takes note of the 1988 protests that occurred under similar circumstances (except led by students), and that led to over 3000 deaths. While there was some hope that the international community would intervene to prevent a repeat of 1988, today’s BBC headline, “Burmese monks ‘to be sent away’” is a good indicator that history may already be repeating itself. So what lessons haven’t been learned?
Negative sanctions don’t work (at least when your friend is China). At the UN General Assembly last week, President Bush announced that the U.S. would be tightening the 10-year-old sanction regime against the country. The newest sanctions consisted of freezing assets of military leaders and preventing government/military officials from gaining American travel visas. Previous sanctions have consisted of withdrawing military and economic aid, including closing American markets to Myanmar exports. The results have been disastrous, as predicted in the Haas and Sullivan article which cites that negative sanctions lead to “economic hardship…insufficient to force desired political change…costly for innocent bystanders…” and at times even to “strengthening of obnoxious regimes.” America’s negative sanctions have been negated by China’s continuing positive engagement with Myanmar, providing economic assistance in return for hydrocarbon resources that assure China economic security and access to Myanmar’s portion of the Bay of Bengal, giving China international security.
This brings us to the second unlearned lesson: International law (in this case, the Security Council) should not be relied upon. At the same United Nations meeting, Myanmar’s allies, China and to a lesser extent Russia, opposed sanctions, citing that the conflict was internal and had no threat to international security. China’s stance within the UNSC reflects its own relationship with Myanmar and confirms Riesman’s idea that the Security Council reinforces current power structures. Each member of the UNSC has their own idea of inter/national security and so long as that division exists, it cannot be relied upon for effective peaceful solutions.
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9868041
--Linh Vuong
The idea of the democratic peace theory brings two questions to my mind: first and foremost is the idea that democracies don’t go to war with each other a valid claim, and second has to due with current affairs and if promoting democracy in places such as the Middle East is the right thing for the U.S. to do.
James Lee Ray stated in his article that democracies do in fact cause peace. While in past history there have been limited exceptions to the idea that democracies do not go to war with each other, in recent memory this claim has remained constant as democracies have not gone to war with each other in some time. This fact leads me to believe in the democratic peace theory for the most part, but at the same time there remains a small area for doubt as past history does show exceptions to the claim. Advocates of this theory have a procedural concept of democracy which include competitive elections, civil rights and freedom of the press along with other factors. However, is U.S. intervention and attempts to promote these factors which lead to democratization the right thing to do?
In the article “The Way We Live Now: Democratosis” which was published in the New York times this past week, Noah Feldman eludes to the fact that Americans can’t stop talking about how other countries should democratize like we are which poses the question of if this is in fact the right idea. In his article Mark Peceny attempts to answer this question in making the claim that U.S. intervention can in fact have a positive influence on democracy in target states if done correctly. While there are many factors that go into this he further explains in 16 examples of U.S. intervention that 14 of these states have changed in the direction of democracy one year later. So is this idea of “Democratosis” as Noah Feldman points out the right one? In my opinion if done correctly it seems to be the right idea at the time as the democratic peace theory seems to prove true at the time being.
Democratic Peace Theory states that democracies are less likely to go to war with one another, as well as have conflicts. This theory is founded in the many historical observations outlined in the reading by James Lee Ray that looked at relations between countries during various periods of time. As the evidence shows, democracies are less likely to become involved in major conflict with one another because leaders are held accountable for their actions and most people would prefer peace to conflict. But are countries with differing ideals always going to be able to find a compromise that will prevent conflict even if they are democracies? When I ask this, I think of how Iran has a different type of democracy than the US and how there is a real possibility of conflict between us. Their elections are different than ours, but hypothetically, if they were the same would they elect the same type of leaders they have recently with what people consider extreme views.
Are other factors like culture strong enough to overcome the effects of democracy? I think that a country like Israel will always by threatened by its neighbors because of their cultural, historical, and religious differences, regardless of whether democracy is present in all of the countries of the region.
The theory does have widespread validity, but I don’t think that the correlation is strong enough to put enough credence into spreading democracy to spread peace. A country like Iraq does not look to be peaceful anytime soon even though they are a young democracy. Iran is a “democracy” but is not a peaceful country in my opinion. Cultural differences will prove to be a stronger factor in the Middle East than democracy on the road towards peace.
Atkinson’s basic claim is that “socializing” militarily with the US will likely lead to a confluence (even if slight) in identity. Although Atkinson emphasizes communication between the U.S. and the engaged state, I think that is essentially one-sided dialogue. In positing that foreign military officers who step on our lands learn to internalize American values, she indirectly claims that the adoption of democratic values and norms makes the U.S. a moral leader. Although this might have been true for her data set, I think that this argument doesn’t hold in the years following 9/11. The U.S. may have an advanced system of government, but some of its attending effects -– consumerism, capitalism, materialism, commercialism, etc. -– may well outweigh a state’s desire to “assimilate.” For these reasons, I want to know more about how she arrived at her conclusion. Which states did she examine? Do certain socioeconomic conditions affect the liberalization success rate? Do the acculturated nations adopt certain democratic values and forego the others?
It was with these questions in mind that I read John Edward’s foreign policy piece, “Reengaging With the World.” Although he argues similarly for the spread of American ideals, he realizes that this is a long-term goal, not a calculated effect. His objective to “reclaim our historic role as a moral leader of the world” is revealing in his use of “reclaim.” Edward acknowledges that global democratization is a worthy end, but it is also a herculean task that remains unrealized at the present. Instead of assuming a constructivist role for the U.S., Edward lists education, disease prevention, provision of clean water, and humanitarian and disaster assistance as ways to reconstruct ourselves in an international light and regain a position of moral leadership. Thus, before the U.S. can expect to convert other states’ identities or export its values, it must fix its own reputation as a democracy. Above all, support for dictators in some countries contradicts the call for democracy elsewhere -– American norms and institutions are weightless in the face of continued support for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan’s Gen. Musharraf. If, at the present, our noble ideations appear as hypocritical and imperialist on the flip side -– how can we seriously expect other states to willingly conform?
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070901faessay86502/john-edwards/reengaging-with-the-world.html
In the article "Development and Democracy," the authors explore how several modern undemocratic governments have learned how to lessen the threat economic development poses to their stability. By denying the public "collaboration tools," such as freedom of the press and uncensored access to the Internet, the article argues, these regimes are able to make it very difficult for their political adversaries at home to coordinate their efforts and increase their visibility to the public.
Controlling access to the Internet is a particularly troublesome task for these governments. Their challenge is to find a balance between access to the global network and their censorship goals.
For example, the Chinese government continues to pour money into their infamous Great Firewall project, designed to censor access to the Internet and monitor the public's Internet use. However, it is relatively easy for a brave person inside China to bypass the firewall and gain access to the Internet in its uncensored splendor.
The ruling junta in Burma employs similar tactics. During the recent protests, many brave people in Burma created and sent information and images over painfully slow Internet connections. The junta eventually decided to close down Internet access to the entire country.
North Korea has chosen to take an isolationist route and deploy a massive private Intranet throughout their country. However, the government has recently been reconsidering this policy due to economic need.
The free flow of information and ideas has always been the enemy of authoritarian regimes. Despite their best efforts, countries that attempt to censor access to the Internet will find their task becoming more and more difficult as Internet and computer access becomes more common in their country. The Internet is needed for their economic survival, but is also a highly effective collaboration tool.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/05/AR2007100501895.html
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7023802.stm
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119179861026851676.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
The article by Mesquita and Downs argues that the relationship between economy and democracy is not as clear as was once thought, and that perhaps economic development is unrelated to democratization. Instead, the more important factor in determining democratization, the article argues, are “coordination goods.” These are resources available to the population of a developing nation, such as free flow of information, rights to congregate and communicate etc. The question then is how have authoritarian governments prevented the emergence of coordination goods despite the economic development?
One potential answer to this lies in the notion of a resource curse. That is, countries that are endowed with valuable natural resources, such as oil, can avoid democratization. This is possible for a variety of reasons, the main one being that the leaders can use the money derived from oil profits to buy off political dissenters or provide social services for their population with relatively low taxes (or no taxes). This is the best explanation for why governments in the Middle East have so consistently avoided democratization. While in theory, these countries are democracies, they show no real steps towards democratization.
China, on the other hand, cannot be explained by the resource curse. While many have cited China as an example of economic progress without democracy, whether or not this remains true is still unclear. China’s economy has still not fully developed in that only a small fraction of the population actually reaps the benefits of economic development. Much of the rural population is underdeveloped and uneducated. In perhaps the most developed part of China, Hong Kong, there have been strong calls for democracy and much upheaval. The recent protests are a good indication of the fact that the stability of the non-democratic regime in China is not a given.
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/07/asia/AS-GEN-Hong-Kong-Democracy.-1st-Ld-Writethru.php
On Wednesday the 10th of October Taiwan held a military parade to show off its military might. They test fired 2 home-made missiles and demonstrated an anti missile defense shield still under development. The point of this parade came about amidst growing hostility between China and Taiwan. The unveiling of the new missiles with a range great enough to hit Chinas mainland was an attempt to balance the scales. China Currently has nearly 1000 missiles aimed at the island. Taiwan now has the capability to strike back if those are launched. This ties in well with the idea of nuclear deterrence. Is China now going to be deterred from using those missiles if it knows Taiwan now has the ability to retaliate? Would China now be less likely to attack Taiwan at all now that its own cities are in danger of attack? Deterrence would suggest yes, that now there is more to loose in starting a war, so one will be less likely.
article at http://www.spacewar.com/
additional article at http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Taiwan_Test_Fires_Cruise_Missile_Capable_Of_Striking_China_999.html
The effect of economic development on democratization is a contested issue. Scholars such as Seymour Martin Lipset have said that economic development creates a middle class with a stake in the system, causing them to create a structure by which they can be heard i.e. a democracy. Because of this it is said that economic development leads to democracy. However during the lecture, the professor stated that Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs were skeptical of this notion and that democracy is not a product of economic development. However, examining the article by de Mesquita and Downs reveals that they do not doubt the idea that economic development creates a middle class with democratic impulses. Their main concern is with states that use the benefits of development to restrict tools of organization to the masses. They do not disagree that left unfettered after economic development, the people would create a democratic state. But even with restrictions on these tools, I believe that economic development would lead to democratization. De Mesquita and Downs use the examples of China to base their argument. However economic development in China is a recent phenomenon that has not reached its maximum capacity. Although China has thousands of protests yearly, they do not represent a wide segment of the population. Most people in China are still engaged in agrarian activity, but once more of the population is brought into the modern economy, more people will have a stake in the government and no matter how much the government restricts the tools of organization, they cannot repress the wishes of a billion people. Therefore struggles for democracy as seen recently in Myanmar are likely to fail at early stages of development because not enough of the population is educated enough to care about the composition of their government.
With the recent topic of democracy and security, one special case stands out - Greece and Turkey. Given the Democratic Peace Theory which states that "democracies never fight each other" (Ray, 34), what explains the extremely high tension between Greece and Turkey? First, Greece and Turkey face a heavy border disputes regarding the Aegean region and Cyprus. Second, both countries are considered parliamentary democracies. Thus, this is a serious matter because Turkey and Greece almost came into armed conflict in the past, like in 1996 over Imia-Kardak. Recently, tensions between the two countries have become strung out again due to the issue of illegal immigrants, with both parties placing fault on the other, as well as pointing to larger issues like their border dispute. This same border dispute used to be a lot worse and involved the military. The Greece-Turkey case provides some evidence that democracies still contain the possibility of fighting other democracies, but we can qualify the case - Greece and Turkey have never gone to war. This may be due to the fact that they both are democracies. Therefore, while it may be the case that democracies may not like other democracies, they still won't go to war with each other. On the other hand, we can see the defusing of their conflicts as the result of entanglement theory - NATO had to intervene some of their disputes in order to prevent military involvement. Since both Turkey and Greece are part of NATO, they had no choice but to comply with NATO's arbitration. Therefore, Greece and Turkey didn't go to war as the result of external forces, not due to their regime type. Either way, the conflicts (and resolutions) between Greece and Turkey are an important area of inquiry regarding the validity of the Democratic Peace Theory.
The recent headlines involving the security company Blackwater have given rise to another point of controversy between Iraq and the US. The fact that the members of Blackwater are exempt from Iraqi law and can skate around international law as well has many other countries and groups within the United States worried about the future dangers of similar security companies. The biggest worry is that this group of well-trained soldiers is not held responsible to any organization and thus its actions cannot be punished if they are found to be in violation of any international law or treaty. There are no incentives for members of these companies to abide by commonly accepted laws while they accomplish their missions on the battlefield. According to an article from bbc.com “… analysts say that without the use of security firms, sustaining ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq would simply be impossible.” Although the United States government is paying the contracts of these soldiers it is tough to entirely place the blame on the government since they do not give direct orders to these soldiers nor are these soldiers bound to the government by an oath like the rest of our conventional soldiers are. So the question becomes is it legitimate to use these types of security firms? What does this do to our credibility when we make demands on other countries (e.g. Iran and North Korea in reference to nuclear weapons developments)? How are these firms different from terrorist groups as actors in the international arena?
National security at the domestic level is often taken for granted and overlooked by issues in the international arena. After watching Dr Strangelove: Or how I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb, the recent Air force mistake of flying nuclear warheads over the continental US has Kubrick-esque implications. A major theme of the movie is the possibility of human error and mechanical procedures leading to nuclear catastrophy. While there was obviously no mistake leading to the detonation of a nuclear warhead, the possibility that a B-52 could accidentally fly over US soil with six cruise missiles armed with warheads has lead to a level of uncertainty in the Air force’s safeguards against such a situation. Much of the readings and discussions in class have dealt with uncertainty’s role in national security. While the uncertainty we’ve discussed relates more to its role in war and conflict, the purpose of national security is to address and remove uncertainty and fear from the general public’s minds. Security, or the feeling of security, dictates government’s actions and agendas. In general, security measures and procedures within the US armed forces are so standard and uniform that the handling of nuclear material is accepted and something with which people are comfortable. This means that the remaining resources are then allocated based on remaining international issues. However, this recent event has called attention back to a basic procedure that was accepted. Much like Kubrick’s film, this recent mistake calls attention to an area of national security generally unquestioned: a nation’s security from its own mechanisms.
Matt Scanlan
The New York Times recently reported that the Iranian nuclear negotiator resigned before scheduled talks with the European Union. This has many in the West fearing that Iran may have ended any chance for a possible negotiated settlement concerning its nuclear program. This article seems extremely pertinent in light of the elements of nuclear warfare explored in Dr. Strangelove. In the film, Kubrick highlights the lack of communication between the military and political leaders of the U.S. and Russia to introduce a level of uncertainty that leads to a highly volatile crisis. Each setting of the film (the war room, base and B2-bomber) is an isolated sphere cut off from the outside world. Whether it is Mandrake searching for a telephone to relay the recall code or President Merkin Muffely consoling the drunk Russian Premier, information is compartmentalized and incomplete on both ends. Hence, the last ditch effort to avert the inevitable nuclear apocalypse is a complete dissemination of information to the Soviets- by allowing their ambassador to see the “Big Board.”
Thus, the film adeptly explores Schelling’s notion of Brinkmanship and how uncertainty can lead nations to unwillingly commit the final step leading to general war. Ultimately, the fact that the Russians did not disclose information about their doomsday device made its possibility as a deterrent utterly useless, resulting in the fateful rodeo plunge and nuclear holocaust.
To return to the current example of the Iranian nuclear targets, it is clearly evident that the loss of negotiations will lead to a great deal of uncertainty regarding the intents of Iran’s nuclear program. With Mr. Ahmadinejad saying “that there was no room to negotiate and that Iran would not back down” a game of brinkmanship without clear “tripwires” will create a sense of fear stemming from unpredictability.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/21/world/middleeast/21iran.html?em&ex=1193112000&en=f6bf71463f1957c3&ei=5087%0A
Turkish planes pound rebels along border
By VOLKAN SARISAKAL, Associated Press Writer
Amidst recent fears of an eminent invasion of Northern Iraq by Turkish military forces Turkish warplanes and helicopters have recently attacked PKK targets in Northern Iraq. Ironically, the Turkish jets that supposedly attacked the position are American made F-16s. This incident is a representation of increasing hostilities that have driven gas prices up to nearly $90 a barrel threatening the energy security of the United States. Furthermore, an invasion by Turkish forces into Northern Iraq would result in major supply shortages for American troops based in Iraq. The majority of food, water and fuel supplies come from supply lines in Northern Iraq. Turkish military actions could prompt the US to threaten military force in order to protect troops and stabilize oil prices. Unfortunately, the US also fears that Turkish military action could undo any recent progress that has been made in Iraq. Currently, Kurdish territories represent one of the few success stories of the Iraq invasion. Undermining this would be devastating to American interest in the Middle East. If the US fails to back the Kurds it could possibly result in further backlash against American forces. Islamic culture recognizes the importance of loyalty when a person offers you their protection that protection must last until death. Thus, the Kurds and the Iraqi government would feel extremely betrayed if the United States fails to defend Iraq’s northern border. This would aid the current insurgency within Iraq giving Iraqis an increased since of betrayal and more reason to support insurgents. In conclusion, the United States is now entrapped in a situation that could result in a war with Turkey. Thus, the US must analyze the costs and benefits of pursuing military action as a deterrent against Turkish invasion.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071025/ap_on_re_mi_ea/turkey_iraq;_ylt=AvqHAb7fblU.wVJeBPMtn2YLewgF
Jordan Lomheim
18461988
PS123C
The Associated Press reported on October 11 that the country of Turkey attacked suspected positions of Kurdish rebels in Iraq and was moving closer to officially declaring military action against rebels in this country. Since 1984, Turkey has experienced unrest and disruptions as a result of Kurdish autonomy fighting in the southeast region of the nation, near its border with Iraq. Turkish military leaders describe attacks into Iraq as necessary because of the aid given by Iraqi Kurds to those in Turkey. The United States is opposed to these kinds of actions
and fear that Turkish intervention in this relatively peaceful area of Iraq will further destabilize the nation. Iraqi officials have strongly replied that any military incursion will be regarded as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. However, in a separate article on October 16 the AP reported that Turkey’s parliament was moving closer to giving the go ahead to raids on Kurds in Iraq. This action not only poses a problem in possible destabilization, but also threatens a key element of the U.S. Security Strategy: Democratic Peace.
As the U.S. continues to try and stabilize the Iraq and touts its new government as a young democracy, a very important factor needed to legitimize their military action in the region is pacification between Iraq and other nations throughout the Middle East. As a NATO ally, and a democratic nation, military action by Turkey against Iraq would contradict the Democratic Peace Theory and the U.S. stance that military action can be prevented by democratization. It is very important for the U.S. to work with Turkey to prevent any military action that will lead to further unrest in the Middle East. In democratizing Iraq, the U.S. must strive to ensure a peaceful relationship between other democracies and Iraq in order to legitimize their involvement in the region.
Jace Hadfield
In recent months Turkey has seen a rise in the frequency and lethality of cross border raids by the PKK. On October 18 a major legislative obstacle to invasion was removed by a parliamentary vote authorizing military action in Iraq. Why has Turkey shown restraint in deploying large numbers of troops and limited its’ actions to cross-border shelling and aerial bombardment and small unit incursion? The Turkish government must consider the costs and benefits of an invasion into northern Iraq to their own domestic stability.
Turkey has conducted large-scale incursions into Iraq from the late 1980s to mid 1990s. During this time thousands died in southeastern Turkey from cross border conflict between PKK and Turkish forces. The Kurds won limited concessions from the Turkish state, and some domestic stability returned. However, sympathy for the PKK among Turkish Kurds remains high. Another large-scale campaign against the PKK runs the risk of serious domestic unrest among Turkish Kurds.
The Turkish public demands action. The military, too, has been hawkish on cross border operations in “hot pursuit” of PKK forces. But the regime seems hesitant and has shown “remarkable restraint” in committing robust and sustained military action. Instead Turkey’s national security council met to discuss the border situation and advised economic measures against groups in Iraq that provide support for the PKK.
Turkish action, thus far, in Iraq has been on a small scale. Limited operations will alleviate domestic and military pressure to act. Fear of wide interstate conflict will galvanize Iraqi, Iraqi Kurdish, and US to build a political solution amenable to Turkish interests. The possibility of a significantly destabilized northern Iraq inflaming Kurdish separatists isn’t a gamble Turkey wants to take. Despite international implications of invasion, the benefits of restraint outweigh the potential cost of widespread domestic instability.
Democratic Peace enforced by the U.S. Military
On Wednesday, October 17, in what represents the first strategic collaboration between the Navy, Coast Guard, and U.S. Marine Corps on issues of protecting the U.S. Homeland and national interests at the international level, maritime officials completed the first major revision in two decades to U.S. Naval strategy, a strategy that will hereby be focused on humanitarian missions and improving international collaboration in order to prevent conflicts. According to the Associated Press, this strategy reflects a broader effort by the Department of Defense in working with fledgling democracies and helping them to stabilize by means of aid, training, and other efforts. This strategy was unveiled before naval representatives of 100 countries and was presented to them by the chiefs and commandants of the three services: Admiral Roughead, USN, General Conway, USMC, and Admiral Allen USCG.
Although this strategy does not void the importance of a combat power presence in susceptible areas such as the Western Pacific Ocean and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean as a mode of deterrence and to dissuade potential adversaries, the document forsees more international partnerships and a force that will defeat terrorism by winning hearts and minds instead of the use strategies that were more appropriate and effective during the Cold War.
The strategy announced by these three branches of the U.S. Armed Forces shows what in my opinion is an active demonstration of a definite effort by the U.S. to promote democratic peace. At the same time, this is also a show of how foreign militaries are being influenced by our own military and how in accordance with the Democratic Peace Theory this document is proposing a more stable world and more widespread peace by means of democracy, however enforced by a military contingency and proaction.
http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,153103,00.html
Credibility, NATO, and National Security
On October 10, the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed a nonbinding vote on H.R. 106 condemning the killings of Armenians in 1915 as genocide. Though it appears that a vote in Congress is a largely domestic issue, H.R. 106 proves how domestic political and international affairs can often collide in very serious ways.
The Turkish government vehemently opposed the vote as it has always denied the genocide, threatening to cut military ties with the United States should the resolution pass. This isn’t mere bluffing or bullying on the part of Turkey, the issue of credibility offers some credence to Turkey’s threat. Turkey cut military ties with France in November 2006 after the French government passed legislation making it a crime to deny the Armenian genocide.
Passing such a resolution would have relatively serious implications regarding national security. Severing ties with Turkey would be damaging to the war effort in Iraq, possibly resulting in a loss of access to ship supplies through Turkey into northern Iraq and a key gateway for the United States military to Iraq. Turkey is the closest NATO ally the United States has to Iraq and passing the vote could potentially cause irreparable damages to that alliance. The NATO alliance serves long-term objectives that further the common interests of member nations and the Bush administration and Turkey have made it explicitly clear that H.R. 106 does not and will not further the interests of either country.
On October 25, most supporters and co-sponsors of the bill backed down. Largely due to the fervent opposition by the Turkish and American governments, foreign policy appeared to trump the efforts. Though supporters claim they will wait until next year for “more favorable timing,” it appears that while many members of Congress were aiming to call attention to the genocide in order to prevent future genocides and stop current ones (i.e., Darfur), the issue of national and military security triumphed in the end.
In February 2007, North Korea finally agreed to close its nuclear reactors in exchange for the fuel aid. Most recently, in October 2007, DPRK also declared that it would close down its other nuclear programs and reactors by the end of this year. Although one can never predict whether North Korea would truly disable its entire nuclear program or not in the future, this is comparatively a significant change in North Korea’s action and attitude - back in 2002 and 2003, nuclear brinkmanship was at its peak. North Korea withdrew from the non-proliferation agreements and the U.S. decided to halt oil shipment to DPRK. North Korea’s long-range missile test in 2006 was a very provocative action, to the international outcry. Since North Korea had begun to build and develop nuclear reactors in the 90s, the U.S. government never declared a war on North Korea. U.S. might have not declared a war on North Korea because of its calculation from such a war - significance of protecting South Korea that is bordering DPRK, as well as diplomatic relationships with Russia and China. North Korea’s comparatively larger armies than South Korea’s armies are one of the factors that could trigger a continuation of the (unofficially ended) Korean war. Also there could be a damage in a diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and Russia, as post-Cold War tension still seemed to have its shadow remained. Thus, as Mueller says, it is not only a militaristic approach and calculation the state takes. U.S. finds it that status quo is better than going on a war with North Korea, considering the diplomatic factors and predicting the potential consequences. Though this absence of war is not necessarily a mark of successful deterrence, still the U.S. finds that peace is substantially preferable to the war - the U.S. government could have raised its estimation of the status quo that it actually let DPRK possess nuclear reactors and programs for almost a decade now, which seems to have come closer to its ending.
June Wui
The Iran Question
"We have information that there has been maybe some studies about possible weaponization, that's why we have said that we cannot give Iran a pass right now, because there is still a lot of question marks. But have we seen Iran having the nuclear material that can readily be used into a weapon? No. Have we seen an active weaponization program? No."- Mohammed ElBaradei, Chairman, United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in comments made at a press conference on 28 October 2007.
I’m beginning to believe that my life is on rewind, and that I’m experiencing a bit of déjà vu. I’ve seen this before; the drumbeat leading the call to war. Several years ago, the President of the United States (for whom, I must ashamedly admit, in the 2000 contest I voted) and his appointed representatives both vehemently and adamantly charged that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and that those weapons constituted a clear and present danger to the United States and her allies. Americans were bombarded with this message; the United Nations, led by the United States and the Security Council, strove to tighten the noose on Iraq’s neck, and made the case for tougher sanctions and even for war.
Of course, this rhetoric and saber rattling occasioned the spawn of a number of stricter measures, including United Nations-sponsored weapons inspection, carried out under the auspices of UNSCOM, the U.N. Special Commission created specifically for that aforesaid purpose. A number of well respected and prolific persons served this Commission, including patriotic American and former U.S. Marine Corps Officer Scott Ritter, who served as an advisor to U.S. Army General and CENTCOM Commander H. Norman Schwarzkopf during what has euphemistically become known as the ’First Gulf War’. The overwhelming majority of these people, including Ritter, reported that their investigations could prove no existence of Iraqi WMD. Notwithstanding these assertions, the U.S. nevertheless invaded Iraq, and remains a virtual occupier of that country to this day. Even David Kay, the chief weapons inspector for the Bush Administration, himself an early and extremely vocal saber-rattler in making the case eventually acquiesced to the lack of Iraqi WMD. The U.S. clearly had egg on its face, yet it remains embroiled in a deadly occupying action in Iraq.
Fast forward to the present, and, despite popular sentiment in the United States having turned against the Iraqi action, arguably the United States stands on the brink of another armed conflict with yet another Muslim nation- this time, Iran. Some of the players are different this time, but the roles are all the same, with Hussein’s part being reprised by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This time, we’re not talking about chemical and biological weapons, but rather nuclear ones.
The school of realism championed by Morgenthau, Waltz, and others tells us that we must view states as pragmatic actors that will always work to further their interests, and, of course, the interest of the United States lies in preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power. I do not argue contrary to this observation, nor do I suggest that an armed incursion will not eventually turn out to be the most rational and prudent course.
However, I do suggest we take time to reflect on our past mistakes, and to ponder how our actions ultimately serve our own purpose. Perhaps the Iraq conflict has made the United States a safer place; then again, perhaps it hasn’t. It’s worth questioning, in any event.
Embargoes Against Myanmar: Will Their Impact Change Anything?
Two weeks ago, President Bush imposed new financial sanctions against Myanmar, freezing US assets of the military government that brutally cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrators near the end of September. These sanctions built on sanctions against 14 officials, five business executives, and seven companies. In addition, the EU imposed an arms embargo on the nation. These are positive steps taken against the oppressive regime. However, Dominic Tierney questions the effectiveness of embargoes. Although he discusses UN embargoes in civil wars, many of his points are applicable here.
According to Tierney, economic embargoes, such as what the US is imposing, generally affect the civilian population more than the leadership. Over time, they limit the development of a middle class, which undermines growth of civil society, an important component of democracies. Tierney argues that economic embargoes succeed when the target group, in this case Myanmar’s military regime, is dependent on external support, is partly democratic, and has a political culture that is open to changes in policy. Although Myanmar depends financially on good relations with neighbors such as China, these states refuse to cut off lending, investment, and trade, deeply hampering the work of the EU and US.
The only real effect of the embargoes against Myanmar seems to be symbolic. A large swath of the international community has signaled its resolve, which should, as Tierney explains, have the effect of deterring more violence against the protesters. The EU and US have continued their efforts to uphold the norms of nonviolence, democracy, and human rights by isolating the state in violation of these norms. Whether or not this does anything more than give enhanced lip service to these norms is debatable.
A final result of the embargoes is that the EU and US have appeared to satisfy the outcry for action, though in reality, without support from China and others in the region, the effect is negligible at best.
NY Times, Oct 20, 2007, "Bush Imposes New Sanctions on Myanmar"
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/20/washington/20prexy.html
Dominic Tierney, 2005, “Irrelevant or malevolent? UN arms embargoes in civil wars”
The world community has developed an international law system that has done very little to prevent or stop genocide from occurring. The Genocide Convention as passed by the United Nations General Assembly, the International Criminal Court, and the various tribunals set up to deal with the aftermath of genocide are all part of a reactive system that focuses more on punishment than prevention.
The Samantha Power article that we read showed how the world community turned its back on the nation of Rwanda and allowed hundreds of thousands of innocent people to be killed. UN peacekeepers were pulled from Rwanda and nations such as the United States were unwilling to commit their own troops to the conflict. There seems to be little point to a genocide convention if it is not enforced in a way that tries to prevent people from being killed. A tribunal was set up after the killing stopped in order to punish those responsible, but it was probably of little comfort to those who lost their loved ones in the conflict.
The lessons of Rwanda and other past genocides have not been learned. The International Criminal Court began preparing for the prosecution of those responsible for the genocide in Darfur over 18 months ago. The perpetrators of the genocide certainly deserve to be punished. However, it seems strange to prepare for trial while innocent people are still being slaughtered.
The world community should alter how it deals with genocide. The United Nations should be at the forefront of preventing or at least limiting genocide. Unfortunately, there seems to be little hope of this happening. The UN did nothing to help those in Rwanda, it was critical of the intervention in Kosovo, and the death toll in Darfur keeps rising. Humanity deserves a system that will truly try to save lives instead of one that is content with a successful prosecution.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1680150,00.html
Pakistan has been a risky ally in the War on Terror. After the September 11th attacks in 2001, Pakistan’s leader General Perevez Musharraf pledged to cooperate with US security goals of capturing known and potential terrorist on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Since then, the Musharraf government has received 10 billion dollars in US aid, mostly intended for military purposes. But despite US stated goals of spreading democracy throughout the Middle East, Pakistan remains a military government with weak democratic institutions. While Musharraf has stated his intent in increasing democratic values, the US has much to fear in regional stability due to increased dissolution with the Musharraf government from internal Pakistani factions. On Saturday, November 3rd Musharraf declared “emergency rule,” effectively instating martial law by cutting international television stations, raiding the Supreme Court, and dispatching the police to the streets.
The US government has vocally denounced Musharraf’s power grab for its anti-democratic attack on the Pakistani constitution. It is fair to assume that US hostility toward the declaration of “emergency rule” is also a result of the unknown ramifications in US national security. Musharraf has proven to be a relatively loyal ally, this incident withstanding. With the loss of Musharraf’s leadership legitimacy due to this seemingly desperate attempt to remain in power, US hopes that Pakistan could transition into democracy while still remaining favorable to the US War on Terror could be squashed. Other political factions, including fundamentalists, could potentially gain power through illegal seizures like that of Musharraf or, even worse, gain power if Musharraf agreed to allow continued democratization.
The US is now in a game of alliance politics in which there does not seem to be any one good answer. The threat posed by Pakistan, a nuclear power in the Middle East, means that US abandonment of its ally is impossible and domestic interference is likely. Another US backed military government in the Middle East, like that of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, would be arbitrary and could potentially lead to war in the future. Alternatively, encouraging democratic elections could result in anti-US and anti-War on Terror factions coming to power. At this point, the US has to hope that Musharraf will back down from this martial rule of law, reinstate government institutions, and be a strong leader towards democracy with the hope that these changes will regain trust in the electorate. As of now, Musharraf’s “emergency rule” appears to be another set back for the already convoluted and increasingly complicated US national security objective.
New York Times
Sunday, November 4, 2007
“Pakistani Sets Emergency Rule, Defying the US” by David Rohde
“Musharraf Leaves White House in a Lurch” by Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Helene Cooper
Superiority complex: why America's growing nuclear supremacy may make war with China more likely by Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press.
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200707/china-nukes (also available through Expanded Academic ASAP)
Chad Winston:
A recent article published in the Atlantic Monthly looks at the implications of American nuclear dominance on future U.S.-Sino relations, specifically how America's pursuit of strategic nuclear weapons threatens to trigger a new arms race with China. The issues outlined in the article signal a possible return to cold war era brinksmanship and provide a useful case for understanding the calculus of actors involved in a security dilemma.
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has sought to widen its missile gap with the rest of the world. The US has been able to comply with arms reduction treaties such as START II largely by replacing its old nuclear arsenal with a smaller number of more technologically advanced weapons. US military strategists now have at their disposal a nuclear capability of tremendous versatility: missiles of increasing precision (99% hit rate), great discretion in terms of warhead yield (.3 kiloton to 1,200 kilotons), and the ability to detonate "air-bursts" to further limit civilian casualties. Ideally, US strategy serves the duel purpose of both deterring nuclear and conventional attacks while also providing for more flexibility response options in a crisis. In Contrast, China has only a small strategic force of aging nuclear weapons – 80 warheads, of which only a few are ICBMs and none of which are immediately deployable. China's arsenal proved more than adequate during the cold war, but will no doubt be insufficient as China naturally wants to develop military capabilities commensurate with its growing economic stature.
The question becomes: how do we best handle a rising China? Lieber and Press argue that the missile gap and America's nuclear strategy will present a difficult paradox for US policy-makers and military planners–one there is no easy answer for. On one hand, this strategy brings the US greater coercive leverage should there be a crisis over Taiwan (a case the authors detail). But the downside is that China, sensing the erosion of true mutual assured destruction and a creeping US containment strategy in Asia, might feel compelled to ratchet up their own capabilities all the more. On the other hand, should the United States make a good faith effort to reduce such strategic weapons, China might feel less threatened and therefore also less likely to engage in an arms race. This route, too, has its cost though, as both US political and military leadership are faced with giving up tools they already possess—counter-force capabilities and bargaining power–in favor of older, blunt instruments which also potentially more unreliable.
Genocide is one of the greatest human rights offenses imaginable, yet when Genocide does occur, the scale of the carnage is usually beyond fathomable. The death tolls from the Holocaust, Cambodia and Rwanda are all difficult to bear, as are the images of emaciated corpses, mountains of skulls or mutilated remains. If such images and thoughts are appalling to the average human, then this begs the question: why do we allow genocide to happen and why do we not try to stop it?
In Samantha Power’s article “Bystanders to Genocide”, she describes the events surrounding the Rwandan Genocide and the US’s failure to intervene in the crisis. She describes the unfolding of the genocide and how, despite multiple intelligence reports warning about the unfolding massacres, little was done to intervene on behalf of the Tutsis. Aside from a few telephone calls warning the Interahamwe leaders that they could be punished for their actions, little to nothing was done otherwise.
Today, we see a repeat of what happened in Rwanda. In Darfur, 400,000 are dead, on top of the million who died in South Sudan during the civil war. In Burma, Chechnya and other places around the world, the killings continue. While it may not be 800,000 dead in 100 days as in Rwanda, these are still atrocities that demand international condemnation and action. As Power indicated in her analysis of the Rwandan Genocide, even simple actions, such as jamming broadcasts, raising public awareness or even just giving sanctuary to those fleeing massacres can help curtail the killings.
Since 1945, the global mantra has been “never again”, yet again and again the world is confronted by genocide. The next time genocide occurs, and sadly, it most likely will, the international community needs to present a strong and united front and should be willing to go as far as authorizing a sizable force to end the killings. Though the international community has taken some positive steps, such as the AU mission to Darfur, more decisive action needs to be taken sooner to prevent a repeat of the past. Only 5,000 well-armed UN troops would have been needed to save hundreds of thousands of Rwandan lives; isn’t such a small contribution worth it so that we can honestly say, “t\never again”.
On October 10, the House on Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution to recognize the mass killings of Armenians by Ottoman Turkish forces during World War One as genocide. With over half the House in support of the measure, it looked as if the resolution was on its way to approval. Yet, as soon as it passed the Committee, the Turkish government, which denies the existence of the genocide, began threatening the U.S. with serious repercussions. Following this, the Bush administration began putting pressure on the House to suppress the resolution and supporters began backing down. By last week, its primary backers had rescinded their support and the resolution was indefinitely shelved.
Exemplified here is the importance of alliances, threats, and credibility in national security. As a member of NATO and an ally of the U.S. in the war on terror, Turkey has proven to be a valuable asset. Importantly, Turkey allows U.S. goods meant for the Middle East to move through its borders, with a notable 70 percent of U.S. cargo intended for Iraq passing through Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey.
It is likely due to the importance of this alliance that the threats made by Ankara, as well as the withdrawal of their U.S. ambassador, had the intended effect. The reaction of the Bush administration visibly demonstrates that they either believed these threats to be credible or that Turkey’s role as an ally was too important to risk the possibility that they were sincere. Either way, the pressure proved effective, and the U.S. backed down.
Furthermore, the situation reveals that although the U.S. is arguably a more powerful nation, threats were still effective against it. It also illustrates that while being a self-proclaimed defender of human rights, the U.S. assigns an importance to national security that at times allows it to take precedence over issues such as moral credibility.
Understanding Humanitarian Intervention
The topic of humanitarian intervention has been controversial for much of the latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Political scientists, like Samuel Huntington, have argued that there is no moral or legal justification for humanitarian intervention (specifically in the case of the United States). Others have argued that we have a moral duty to prevent genocide and torture from taking place.
In his article on the humanitarian intervention debate, J.L. Holzgrefe offers a definition of the term (humanitarian intervention) that I find to be problematic. He defines humanitarian intervention as "the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations...without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied" (18). I find this definition to be problematic primarily because it is too broad- it can include a potential invasion of Rwanda on one hand, and the ongoing war in Iraq on the other.
Let's take the ongoing war in Iraq as an example. Under the definition that Holzgrefe provides, we can classify our invasion into Iraq as a "humanitarian intervention." Many foreign policy experts at the time of our invasion argued that our aim was to remove a ruthless, totalitarian dictator from power who had been violating the human rights of his people. The definition, however, does not take into consideration alternative explanations or underlying motives for the invasion (i.e. oil, prevalence in the Middle East, etc.)
I would argue that a more appropriate definition of humanitarian intervention must directly address this issue of underlying (other) motives that may define a particular country's invasion of another country. Or else, we are left with no definitional means of distinguishing between a potential invasion of Rwanda and an invaded Iraq.
The book “The War over Iraq” by Kaplan and Kristol identifies the ideology of the Bush Administration as “American Internationalism”; the coupling of “American Power” to American Ideals”. This new approach offers Americanism as a “model for the world”. The ideology calls for the incorporation of the spread of freedom and democracy on a global scale into official national security strategy and redefines the concept of a “threat”. No longer should military aggression be directed exclusively toward threats of imminent danger, but should include those threats posed by opposing ideologies which restrict freedom and reject democracy.
I found myself considering this new approach while reading about 2008 presidential candidates’ positions on the War in Iraq. In the 2008 election guide published by the NY Times, candidates were asked whether they felt the war was right to begin with, whether they were in favor of the “surge” of new troops, and whether they felt withdrawal was an appropriate action at this time. As I read their responses, I found myself focusing on the way in which responses were phrased; did they use words like “freedom” and “democracy” when defending the preemptive strike on Iraq? Did they argue that the war was unjustified because intelligence fabricated imminent threats to US security? If so, were these threats shown to be credible, would the war have then been justified?
The book “The War over Iraq” shows that a new way of approaching foreign policy has emerged from a combination of threats from non-state actors that cannot be contained within a single border and the reaffirmation of the American dedication to freedom and democracy as an international standard. With the surfacing of this new “American Internationalism”, one must analyze the motivation behind policy decisions and change the way in which candidates are assessed. No longer is the pertinent answer “yes” or “no”, but an explanation of “why”.
In addition to my blog post, I wish to add my overwhelming disappointment in the assignment of this book, “The War Over Iraq”, under the guise of providing a scholarly discussion of current national security issues, when the publication is clearly little more than another example of inaccurate, narrow, and poorly constructed right-wing propaganda. The authors, Lawrence Kaplan (senior editor of The New Republic, an overtly one-sided and pinhole-vista’d publication) and William Kristol (chairman of the right-wing think tank the Project for the New American Century and political analyst for the comically one-sided Fox News Channel) are true to form in their failed attempt to produce an academically viable discussion of the Iraq War. The book provides a blatantly biased interpretation of events by right-wing war mongers whose ideas are exemplary of the cardboard cut-out explanations given by the GOP for the past 5 years. That this text would be provided as an educational tool at a public university is disheartening. Perhaps we should hold our breaths for the assignment of texts by Michael Moore and Al Franken, as they surely embody the same level of “objectivity” seen in the book we have just read.
As September 11 becomes the excuse for all US military actions around the world, it too has become the cry for “American internationalists” such as authors Kristol and Kaplan as they attempt to argue for the Bush administration’s curtailment of international law and human rights conventions by pointing to others who are curtailing those very same laws and conventions. The mantra of this “pot” has been to call the kettle black.
Written in 2003, The War over Iraq sums up the misguided calculations made by the administration and its supporters in defending the rationale for the war, and in predicting the outcomes of the war in Iraq.
In wholehearted support of the Bush doctrine, the book presents the calculations on which the war was based; the vast majority of which have since been discredited. [1] Kaplan and Kristol support an American foreign policy based on what President Bush refers to as “the union of our values and our national interests.”[2] Extending from the American exceptionalist position that the US political system is a model for the world, the “Bush Doctrine” codifies three principles: preemption, regime change and continued American preeminence.
The War over Iraq promotes establishing norms conducive to American values worldwide. It states that the US will do whatever is necessary to “keep [its] military strengths beyond challenge” and limit its “rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”[3]
Beyond the miscalculations and misrepresentations made by the current administration, a threat arises when considering the rising power of non-democratic China and the ensuing competition for scarce resources as well as the rhetoric used by the administration involving Iran. [4]
We must worry when people deny China the opportunity to become a “real strategic partner” or Iran a chance to be ‘normalized’ into the democratic world. Opportunity should exist independent from the blessing of the US.
1. Examples include the presence of WMD’s and proof of direct connections between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda.
2. Kaplan and Kristol. War over Iraq. 2003. 38.
3. Ibid. p 74.
4. See: State of the Union Address. 2006.
Within the pages of The War over Iraq, authors Lawernce Kaplan and William Kristol make an impassioned argument for applying the so-called “Bush Doctrine” to a pre-2003 invasion Iraq. Described as the promotion of central American liberal ideals through the preponderance of American military and economic power, the “distinctly American internationalism” encapsulated within the Bush Doctrine has animated and informed America’s post 9-11 foreign policy, bringing together “the most successful elements of realism and liberalism” to create what its proponents celebrate as “a roadmap for a more hopeful future.”
The Bush Doctrine and its charge to “go forth and democratize” has taken a beating over the past couple of years, given the difficulties and costs of the Iraq occupation and the Bush Administration’s stalled efforts in creating a viable Iraqi democracy. The hopeful future extolled within The War over Iraq, at the very least, has exacted a high price from both the United States and the Iraqi people, and its successful realization is anything but a given reality for Iraq or the region in general.
In the shadow of this doubtful outlook, the Bush Doctrine recently faces a new challenge in the suspension of the constitution and declaration of “emergency rule” Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, in which protests have been outlawed, thousands of dissidents jailed, and military law has been amended in order to prosecute civilians under military courts. Although there have been modest calls by the Bush Administration for Musharraf to end the state of emergency and place elections once again onto the foreseeable Pakistani political timetable, the tone of these declarations have been underlined with a firm sense of realism, which recognizes Musharraf “as an ally America [needs] in the fight against Al Qaeda” and the larger war on terror. It seems George Bush and his administration is now walking a tightrope between the idealism and realism embodied within the doctrine that bears his name. The coming months will be telling in how well the administration is able to achieve this feat and revel even more as to the viability of the Bush Doctrine as a future roadmap to American foreign policy
See the following for some interesting discussions on this issue:
http://www.opinionjournal.com/weekend/hottopic/?id=110010847
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/magazine/07wwln-lede-t.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/12/world/asia/12pakistan.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin
Conventionally, we examine national security questions at the international level of analysis. Yet, when we consider the units we are vying to secure to be individuals, families, and business (instead of government, borders, institutions), domestic upheaval should count as an integral component of national security.
Currently in Pakistan, General Musharraf has instituted another state of emergency in the face of escalating domestic pressures that he considers to compromise their (and their allies’) war on terror.
Is this movement merely a feign in order to maintain power and a direct military presence in civilian government beyond proscribed constitutionality? Or is it a sincere response to uphold the draconian measures to combat fundamentalist/extremist (and anti-government) groups.
We typically place primacy on democratic values. But given the existential implications of national security, many decisions should stay out of the realm of the tenuous predilections of the masses.
Many perspectives on the current Pakistan crisis could be considered. I will consider one of them briefly, that is the uncertainty of the US action/influence into its country. As the US continues it War on Terror, Musharraf should rightly fear US action; Pakistan is a strategic nexus for prominent terrorist networks and a vital interest for the US to contain. It has been in US interest to promote Musharraf’s repeated constitutional circumventions in order to suppress and rout said networks. However, if Pakistan fails to evidence that it can do so, it may rightly fear significant US pressure/intervention. The US has conducted isolated missile strikes near the Afghan border and will surely take greater control, as it deems necessary.
The prospect of direct US interference/intervention is a direct long-term affront to Pakistani national security, and Musharraf is mindful. This current domestic crisis in Pakistan is about more than democracy and executive constraints, it holds layers of broader concerns about its position and capacity on the international stage.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10303175/
http://article.wn.com/view/2007/11/13/Bhutto_calls_on_Musharraf_to_resign_z/?section=LatestInternationalNews&template=worldnews%2Findex.txt
Upon reading the case for the war in Iraq, as presented by Kaplan and Kristol, and about the Bush Doctrine in general, I was impressed by the logic behind this “internationalist” approach. However, while the doctrine makes sense in the abstract, I wonder about the practicality of this approach. Kaplan and Kristol predicted that the whole operation should be near completion in a year or two, totaling 16-32 billion, with a maximum of 75,000 troops. Futhermore, they see the task of installing a democratic government in Baghdad as “manageable” (Kaplan and Kristol, 98), and they criticize the passivity of the elder Bush and Clinton who realized the potential pitfalls of Iraq. The current President had access to the same information as his predecessors, including Clinton’s war simulations that estimated that 400,000 troops might not even be sufficient (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15570330/), but his idealistic foreign policy stance lead him to war. Clearly, the caution exercised by the previous presidents is now understandable.
Another issue that struck me was the authors’ insistence on sacrificing the material well being of Americans for principles. While a noble stance, they assume that the average American citizen cares about all the foreign policy issues that they cite. For example, Kaplan and Kristol criticize Clinton for delinking trade and human rights with China, but do American citizens have a right to better economic status at the expense of Chinese internal policy? Furthermore, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (with Iraq as the far more costly endeavor), have cost the average American family of four nearly 21,000 since 2002 (http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/13/hidden.war.costs/index.html). In a democratic society, is it fair for the government to pursue such lofty and idealistic foreign policy goals at the expense of its own citizens’ welfare?
The deep contrast between Kaplan’s and Kristol’s argument of what a post-Saddam Iraq would look like and the postwar Iraq that Biddle and Fallow problematize is very interesting. The divergence of desired postwar outcomes and present realities begs the question, is the strategy of preemption the culprit of postwar atrophy?
Kaplan and Kristol assert that “We will not have civil war in Iraq… Iraq has not had a history of communal conflict.” Yet, Biddle directly refers to postwar Iraq as a country in the throws of communal civil war. He bases his argument of further escalation of the war— if Iraqitization is implemented— as a result of faction power struggles in both the parliament and the Iraqi military. The fact that it is a communal civil war necessitates military and economic intervention that engage the different factions instead of opting for scheduled troop withdrawal.
Biddle argues that the power of the US military needs to be implemented to change the factions’ incentives to formulate compromises for power sharing. This is a complete turn around from the rosy projections offered by Kaplan and Kristol. They argued that after a few years the cost and required military presence would quickly decrease. Democratization of Iraq was to be, in theory, a smooth transition from an authoritarian to a parliamentary system.
Then there is the argument of preemption. Kaplan and Kristol supported preemption based on the logic that it was paramount to America’s security to strike at Saddam before he could strike back. Since Saddam was an irrational leader deterrence would not work. The argument is too simplistic. The postwar challenges were glossed over. To summarize Fallow’s article, the aversion to “detailed thought about the postwar situation meant facing the cost and potential problems.” Though extensive pre-war analysis presented scenarios that predicted present outcomes, the final plans disregarded these probabilities. The White House chose to embrace the positive over the negative. Choosing to concentrate on the positive, it turns out, was selecting uncertainty over undesired expectations. I would argue that preemption is behind the mindset of “we don’t exactly deal in ‘expectations.’ ” The piecemeal nature of postwar strategy is a direct result of this mindset.
One of the most fundamentally important, yet least understood, developments in security studies in the Post-Cold War era is the profound growth and expansion of the private military industry. This continually developing industry, where firms not only supply the goods of warfare, but rather carry out many of the professional service functions, has wide ramifications for global politics and warfare.
These firms are in the words of industry expert Peter Singer, “the corporate evolution of the age-old practice of mercenaries,” and they convey a dynamic and important trend in the security policy of the United States. While the existence of these firms predates the George W. Bush presidency, there have been two momentous political events that have driven the rise of PMFs (private military firms) during his term. The first, September 11th, created the impetus for a dramatic expansion of aggressive United States foreign policy and the Bush Doctrine as laid out in the 2002 National Security Strategy. This lead directly into the second dynamic, the Iraq War, that has created the largest market share for PMFs in the modern era. The numbers for the PMF presence in Iraq dwarf any past operations. Over 60 firms employ more than 20,000 private personnel carrying out military functions (in addition to the thousands of additional civilian contractors providing reconstruction or oil services). To put this into context, such numbers mean that the private military industry has contributed more forces to Iraq than any other member of the U.S.-led coalition, being nearly equal to all the states excluding the U.S. combined.
The most chilling fact about the expansion of this industry may be its lack of accountability and transparency. There have been sensational news stories regarding events in Iraq; such as the 2004 murder of 4 contractors in the streets of Fallujah (which directly lead to the heavy US engagement there), the role of private interrogators in the Abu Grahib scandal, and the September 16th 2007 shootings by Blackwater USA contractors in Nisoor Square in Baghdad. However, despite media outbursts over these stories and low levels of political unrest, the industry remains essentially unresponsive and immune to international and national laws. This is show best by two basic facts: (1) the Pentagon, the primary contractor of private security contractors in Iraq, does not even know how many private security personnel it employs in Iraq at any given time, and (2) through the war, not a single one of the approximated 20,000 private security personnel have been convicted of a crime as they have been given immunity to Iraqi Law. Does this mean that there are 20,000 angels in Iraq who just happen to be predominantly ex-military forces laden in heavy machine guns and riding in armed personnel carriers? O rather is there some type of legal accountability breakdown?
To adopt an idea from Clemenceau, who famously stated that “war is too important to be left to the generals,” it is now reasonable to ask whether “war is too important to be left to the CEOs of multinational corporations?”
The current situation in Pakistan is troubling to the global community as a whole, and I am especially perturbed by it as an American citizen. President Pervez Musharaf recently declared military rule in the country on November 3 to “fight rising extremism”, but his true objectives are anything but.
By suspending the constitution, curtailing independent media and arresting protesters, Musharraf ensured that his October reelection would not be overturned. His victory was challenged on constitutional grounds by many of his opponents, and the Court was scheduled to listen to their complaints on November 13. However, Musharraf made the State of Emergency declaration before proceedings could begin. As General of the Pakistani military, Musharraf is enjoying the best of both worlds: he remains in power while not having to yield to his adversaries.
Unfortunately, the United States is in a very precarious situation with Pervez Musharraf that has amounted in President Bush not doing much more beyond wagging his proverbial finger. Shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Musharraf supported America’s War on Terror by assisting in the incarceration of numerous al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. This amount of success, though, has not been sustained. Despite financial aid from the US nearing 10 billion dollars, Pakistan has come up dry as of late. While the country has not produced the results the global community has been looking for, the United States Government is deeply indebted to them, and has situated itself in a committed relationship with no apparent end in sight.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Musharraf has made efforts fostering terrorism – both directly and indirectly. In 2006, the president agreed to a cease-fire, allowing militants to regroup. Since, al-Qaeda has resurfaced in Pakistan. Training camps have been established, while numerous suicide bombings linked to al-Qaeda operatives occurred within the nation. In addition, the State of Emergency has indirectly encouraged terrorist activity; Musharraf has allocated resources to thwarting the efforts of lawyers, journalists and human-rights activists instead of honing in on the real culprits.
Going back to the Kaplan and Kristol reading, one could make the argument that the Bush administration is an administration guided by a moral objective. The authors identified the Clintonian "wishful liberalism", that essentially wanted to "wish" problems away with no real direct action; the authors also identified the more realist approach during the Bush Sr. administration.
As stated, it is quite apparent that the current Bush administration is one that has a moral objective coupled with the initiative. That is, to use US power to spread democracy around the world. And in doing so, it is using almost unilateral US power to spread democracy. It is not pre-occupying itself with trying to gain the UN's support in completing their objectives.
Thomas Barnett, a staunch supporter of the current Iraq War, (I know we were not assigned any of his books, or articles, but he is a very popular author when it comes to this subject, and was one of Donald Rumsfeld's assistants, if I remember correctly...), has stated that it is the United States' RESPONSIBILITY to deploy its military (He uses the term "The Leviathan" to describe the US military...)to global hot spots in the fight against Terror.
If this continues to be US policy, that is, to send troops to fight FARC rebels in Colombia, Bosnia, countries in Africa (Nigeria, Sudan) etc., does it currently or will it ever have the resources (economic, political, and military) to continue such a policy?
A better question may be: How will the US military respond to constant deployment to global hot spots that may or may not be deemed vital to the security interests of the US by government officials OUTSIDE of any given US administration.
The reasoning behind that question is that Barnett states the following question in his book: "How do you fight a super empowered terrorist? With a super empowered and motivated US Marine". That said, is the moral objective of the Bush administration a rational objective, given the fact that "boots on the ground" will be needed? Futhermore, is the "active internationalist" foreign policy a policy that will require more "tying in" (aka bind US domestic security concerns with foreign concerns; as was the case with the current Iraq War) on behalf of any US administration.
When we think of national security issues, we often consider the use of military force as one among several main means of achieving our foreign policy and security objectives. However, while national security debates focus heavily upon discussions of issues such as the efficacy of airpower, the role of nuclear deterrence after the Cold War, cost-benefit calculations, and evaluation of our national security strategy, what is less often discussed is the effect such policy decisions have upon the individuals tasked with carrying them out. Specifically, the discussion that often falls by the wayside is the effect that war has upon individual soldiers, both during and after conflicts such as Afghanistan or Iraq.
While for policy planners, security analysts, academics, and most of the American public, the use of military force is an abstract strategic and political issue, for the individual soldier, war is anything but; regardless of policy objective, war is a highly personal, dangerous, and in some cases, severely debilitating experience.
Abstract policy debates about the “war on terror,” US foreign policy, and the idea of preemptive war, become situations in which soldiers must risk their lives, as illustrated by the Master Chief's lecture last week on his combat experiences. This is a sharp contrast from the debate that occurs from the perspective of the American public and politicians, where the war is measured from a more abstract metric of numbers: the total amount of money spent, casualties, and domestic and foreign public support, and so on.
With that said, the question is, how should the human cost of wars be factored into our future policy decisions? How should the additional costs of wars or humanitarian interventions, such as those associated with long term care of disabled and wounded veterans, be calculated against the policy objectives sought? Such a problem, though perhaps less evident now, is already beginning to crop up; specifically, in domestic news stories regarding the treatment of veterans by the VA system, and in stories of the difficulties Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans face in postwar readjustment. Other news stories also speak of the costs of treating wounded veterans, as well as the effects of undiagnosed psychological or physical injuries from combat. Over time, these issues will create additional costs to warfare that are distinctly separate from the current focus upon military budgetary concerns, material capabilities, and bipartisan politics.
In spite of the often acrimonious debate between the right and left regarding the war in Iraq, both sides should recognize that the use of force in the pursuit of national security, while important for strategic and geopolitical reasons, also implicitly has costs beyond the number of expected casualties or other similar considerations. Similarly, while studies of the war's effects upon domestic public opinion and support, as done by Gelpi, Mueller, and Jentleson, are important and useful, other considerations, as illustrated by The Long Road Home, The War Within, and news stories regarding the effects of the war upon veterans, should not escape our attention.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/08/us/08vets.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/13/AR2007111301459.html
Two recent New York Times articles highlight how much the feasibility of the Bush Doctrine and neo-conservative influence has declined.
A November 26, 2007 article, "Rice's Turnabout on the Mideast Peace Talks" discussed Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's change of heart regarding American involvement in mediating the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Bush Administration had initially advocated for a limited-intervention foreign policy, believing the Clinton Administration’s pro-active approach had often made situations, including the Middle East peace process, worse. Kaplan and Kristol complicate this view, stating that Bush had also appointed more "internationalist" policy makers such as Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld (who had signed the Project for the New American Century and brought in underlings such as Wolfowitz). They stood in contrast to those, such as then Sec. of State Colin Powell, who believed in intervening abroad only if American interests were at stake. They portray Dr. Rice (even though being part of the Vulcan group) as belonging to the Powell camp. The article, however, implies otherwise, stating that Dr Rice initially sided with Cheney and Rumsfeld's (ironically) non-interventionist stance. Her position has since then changed and she has managed to bring the President to her side. One result has been the recent Annapolis Peace conference. But Dr. Rice's positions had changed on numerous issues over the years, and she has attempted to use her close relationship with the President to counter the influences of the two men who drove policy in Bush's first term: Rumsfeld and Cheney. Numerous times she succeeded in toning down the rhetoric of both men on Iran, North Korea, and even Iraq during the run-up to the war. Though often portrayed as a Bush lackey, the article showed how Dr. Rice's attitudes have changed over the years and how she often disagreed with the tenets of the Bush doctrine and the larger neo-conservative agenda.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/26/washington/26rice.html
A November 28, 2007 article "Defense Secretary Urges More Spending for U.S. Diplomacy" shows how much things have changed at the Pentagon since the days of Donald Rumsfeld. Iraq, state Kaplan and Kristol, "reversed the equation, pitting a State Department that warns about the perils of the use of force against a Pentagon team that believes in its efficacy....To the State Department, Colin Powell has brought his peculiar brand of realism, while to the Pentagon, robust internationalists like Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz have brought their more expansive views of America's global role" (70). In contrast, current Sec. of Defense Robert Gates, in a speech at Kansas State University, called for more funds to bolster "soft power" i.e. economic assistance and diplomacy. He noted that a huge discrepancy exists between the Defense and State Department budgets, $500 billion compared to $36 billion. When it came to asymmetric warfare, military force alone cannot accomplish American goals. Gates urged the creation of a civilian response corps, made up of experts in areas like agriculture, urban infrastructure, law, etc, to work alongside the military to establish stability in places like Iraq. Under Rumsfeld, such policy recommendations would have been considered, as Gates joked, “blasphemy.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/washington/27gates.html
Although Iran still has ways to go before they can build a successful nuclear bomb, the American public has been up in arms over the mere fact that an unstable Middle Eastern country may have nuclear weapon technology. Iran claims that its nuclear program is peaceful and only to be used for energy purposes, but the US still believes that Iran’s goal is to build a nuclear weapon. The United States as well as other great powers has turned to the United Nations (UN), United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) to help discourage the Iranian nuclear program. Recent reports (12/03/07) say that Iran is not in a rush to produce nuclear weapons but many still believe that Iran is a serious threat (CNNpolitics.com).
Why is the hegemonic power of the world, the United States, having such difficulty in preventing Iran from developing nuclear technology? This situation is a product of the time we are living in and the results of bad policy decisions on the hands of the Bush administration. Nuclear technology has become an even stronger commodity in the 21st century. Possession of nuclear technology enhances international prestige, provides better security, and gives a country more bargaining power when it comes to dealing with the advanced nations. The invasion of Iraq has also played a negative role in the efforts to prevent countries from developing nuclear technology. Counties that possess nuclear weapons do not get invaded because the risk of nuclear warfare would be extremely likely. Iran understands that and fears that they will eventually become the next Iraq, which is why they have been so adamant in developing nuclear technology.
What can be done? Unfortunately at this point not much can be done, especially under this administrations questionable policy decisions. America can only hope that the US and other dominating nations continue to engage in diplomacy with Iran and the new administration in 2008 comes up with an enticing deal that leads to the halt of a possible nuclear weapons program in Iran.
-L. Steed
Iran and the United States: The Emerging Security Paradigm in the Middle East
As the Presidential elections near, it hard to avoid the topic of the Iran and the growing threat of nuclear proliferation. A recent US intelligence report said that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. "The prospect of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons has been a major concern for both regional and international powers." Iran continues to argue that its nuclear program is only for domestic purposes. That is why the release of this intelligence report is both encouraging and scary.
Earlier in the semester we talked about the US sharing its intelligence with other countries because we have the most sophisticated tools and money to compile this information. After our faulty reports about WMD's in Iraq it is hard for the international community, let alone the American public beleive these new intelligence reports.
With the failure of the US to restore political and military stability, Iran has become a regional leader. “It is Iran, not the United States, that is the most influential ‘exter-nal’ power in Iraq, with an unparalleled ability to affect stability and security
across most of the country.”
Not only is Iran still a dangerous threat to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but they remain a major influence on how Iraq is going eventually stabalize. Deterrence no longer seems to be applicable to Iran, and the US needs to realize that sanctions are not working and new measures need to be taken.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7139526.stm
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/13/AR2007121301288.html?hpid=topnews
The house passed a bill banning waterboarding by the CIA but President Bush has already signaled he will veto it if it makes it to his desk. Bush’s argument (we all probably know it by heart at this point) is basically that limiting the techniques available makes it harder to track terrorists and stop terrorist attacks. I personally don’t buy that, but, I think that there are important secondary implications of the poor treatment of detainees that the Bush administration is missing, especially if you take “Occupational Hazards,” the article by David Edelstein, seriously. One of Edelstein’s major points is that for an occupation to succeed the occupying power must maintain its stamina, part of which means the people of the occupying power must maintain their support of the occupation. The occupied power must accept the occupiers as legitimate as well, which means they probably have to see the occupiers as “good guys.” Harsh tactics like this severely damage the image of the United States not just in Europe but in Iraq and in the U.S. itself. As a result, domestically, this feeds disillusionment in the U.S. moral character and in the rightness of anything that we do, making people less likely to support the war. In Iraq, people see the U.S. behaving horribly and logically they won’t be particularly inclined to support the occupation forces. Even assuming that torture actually does work better than more restrained techniques (which, again, I have doubts about), formalizing and basically declaring to the world, especially to the peoples of America and Iraq, that we’re OK with something just about everybody else considers torture severely damages our chances for success. If drives away hearts and minds. We can’t possibly win (whatever it means to win) in an environment like that.
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/09/africa/ME-GEN-Iran-Iraq-Security.php?WT.mc_id=rssap_news
Iraqis say US must engage with Iran for Mideast security
In light of the recent U.S. intelligence reports that states that Iran suspended nuclear weapons development under international pressure in 2003, the United States must now be very careful as to what action they plan on taking with Iran within the near future. Toby Dodge’s proposal of the U.S. taking note of how international pressure can influence Iran and substitute hardline rhetoric with higher level of diplomatic engagement, seems like good policy in the near future. It seems that our current policies are not creating open channels for discussion between Iran and other Middle Eastern countries to the extent they should be open. Iraqi National Security Adviser Mouwaffak al-Rubaie's call for engagement with Iran is very much needed. Iran and Iraq could one day live in peace together and both be friendly with the United States but there must be open diplomatic discussion and possibly provide Iran with positive sanctions in helping create peace accords and treaties with Iraq and with its neighboring middle eastern countries. The United States raise its level of engagement needs to directly hold talks with high-level Iranian officials to ask important questions such as why it is continuing its uranium enrichment programs if there nuclear weapons development program has been suspended? For the security of Iraq and the Middle East overall, the United States can not play hard ball and hold out on talks for much longer or else Iran could single handedly erase much of the work and money that the United States has put into Iraq and the Region.
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